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THE probable addition of Brazil to the formidable list of the enemies of Germany suggests promising possibilities. Participation in the war by the South and Central American states will not add appreciably to the military and financial strength of the anti-German combination; but it will add substantially to the moral strength of the league and to the diplomatic opportunities of the existing situation for American statesmanship. It will tend to complete the moral and diplomatic isolation of Germany. It will help further to disintegrate the old system of international law with its combination of irresponsible belligerency and equally irresponsible neutrality, and to substitute for it a better system which will seek to make all enlightened and inoffensive nations jointly responsible for the international security and order. It will afford the President an immediate excuse to propose the incorporation of the Monroe Doctrine into international law and to secure from the European Allies a formal guaranty against aggressive diplomatic or military operations in the western hemisphere. Finally, it will have the advantage for the American government of increasing the authority of the new world in the counsels of the league of nations. It will strengthen the specifically American influence upon the joint policy of the Allied Powers. Before the treaty of peace is signed there may be difficult adjustments to contrive between the somewhat special interests which America, as contrasted with Europe, will have in framing the settlement. In so far as Central and South America can be brought in, America will be the more likely to succeed in securing respectful consideration for its peculiar interests.

FOUR justices of the United States Supreme Court believe that the Oregon minimum wage law is constitutional; four believe that it is unconstitutional. One, having been of counsel, may not express an opinion. So much appears from the decision rendered by the court last Monday. Since the state supreme court, from which the case was appealed, had sustained the law, the effect of this equal division is that the measure stands as a constitutional enactment. It is hardly more than an accident of procedure that the result was not just the reverse. If the aggrieved employer had happened to choose the course taken by the railroads in fighting the Adamson law, and brought an injunction suit in the federal district court, and if, as has so often happened, the district court had given the benefit of the doubt to the employer, and held the law unconstitutional, the effect of an equal division in the Supreme Court would have been to affirm the adverse decision, and the law would have been invalidated. On such precarious chances the fate of a law of the first importance has depended. Nothing could bring more strikingly to light the constant peril of leaving to the courts their present power of reviewing legislation under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.

AN ultimate adverse decision in the courts is not the only risk to which social legislation will be exposed, so long as the courts retain their anomalous power over legislation. There is the

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enervating and deadening delay as the cases drag their way in endless litigation. The Oregon minimum wage law was passed in 1913. The following year it safely passed the gauntlet of the state courts. Only in April, 1917, is it finally sustained in the United States Supreme Court. During those four years, which should have been years of fruitful experiment and practical experience, we have had instead a complete and useless paralysis. Instead of taking advantage of the popular impulse which resulted, in 1912 and 1913, in minimum wage laws in eleven different states, instead of utilizing it to energize the administration of these laws, we have allowed it to dissipate, while lawyers argued and courts deliberated. In the meantime state officials have hesitated to enforce minimum wage laws, and legislatures in other states have hesitated to pass new ones. Now the popular impulse has been diverted to other channels, and the invaluable social energy generated in the presidential campaign of 1912 is lost. Is not this too heavy a price to pay for an antiquated constitutional remnant of our forefathers' distrust of democracies?

IF as a part of the organization for war it becomes necessary to conserve the American food supply and regulate its distribution, Mr. Herbert Hoover is incontestably better qualified than any other American to be placed in charge of the work. The statement, consequently, that he will return to this country and become the head of the Food Bureau in the Council of National Defense will be greeted with unalloyed satisfaction. But if he abandons his existing work at the call of his country, the government of his country should reward him by assuring the success of the task of philanthropy which has absorbed his energies since the beginning of the war. It should place at the disposal of the Commission for Belgium Relief a regular appropriation abundantly sufficient to maintain a food supply for the people of Belgium and northern France. The American government is now about to lend billions of dollars to France and Russia to assist those countries in carrying on the war. It certainly can afford to lend, or better to give, a few hundred millions to Belgium so as to assist in keeping alive the innocent and suffering victims of ruthless German aggression. Now that the American nation has entered the war not merely to protect its legal rights but for the purpose in part of preventing such crimes as the violation of Belgium, it cannot testify more emphatically and effectively to the sincerity of its new attitude than by assuming a large part of the burden which the British and French governments have been assuming for the feeding of the Belgian people.

IT is absurd that Miss Rankin's vote on the question of war and peace should be exaggerated to the size of a great political incident, that it should be supposed to have some bearing upon the ability of Miss Rankin's sex to play a capable and useful part in politics. What Miss Rankin did was to hesitate as to how she should vote and finally to join the minority against the declaration of war. Whether or not her vote was accompanied by tears is doubtful, but she certainly cast it under the influence of strong emotion. This was not a heroic performance. It afforded no indication of the future regeneration of legislative assemblies owing to the presence in their midst of women. No more did it prophesy their future degeneration from the same cause. It afforded no indication of any ability on Miss Rankin's part to bring unusual political intelligence to her work as Congresswoman. Even the importance of her decision to vote against war can easily be over-emphasized, for, apparently, she hesitated up to the last moment and narrowly escaped a vote for war under the influence of the ordinary "patriotic" or "political" motive. But her behavior, although it was perhaps undistinguished and unmeaning in substance was neither undistinguished nor insignificant in manner. What Miss Rankin added to the Congressional deliberation about war and peace was not a note of competence or wisdom, but one of sincerity. In being of two minds until the last moment whether to vote for war or peace she was only acting as the representative of the majority of American men and women. She was only reproducing the actual state of mind of most of her fellow legislators only a few weeks before. In betraying emotion when she finally cast her vote she was only behaving as her fellow legislators might well have behaved under the same circumstances. If a few men had shown as much emotion in voting for war as Miss Rankin did in voting for peace, there would be a better prospect of securing their assistance in making the war fruitful. What Miss Rankin did was to suffer the full force of the conflict between patriotism and humanism and to express it with unofficial candor. If she can continue to be similarly sincere, she will add a quality to the deliberations of the House of Representatives which it needs quite as much at the present time as it needs competence and wisdom.

SOME British official has put the London Nation on the list of papers which cannot be sent to foreign countries. Having become a partner of the British Empire in a war for democracy, Americans are now forbidden to read the foremost organ of the English liberal democracy. By issuing the order the very week America entered the war the

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bureaucrats certainly selected a handsome moment for this piece of grotesque stupidity. It was genial and tactful of them, for the Nation is one of the two or three English publications that have consistently worked for Anglo-American coöperation. The weekly has been a conspicuous friend of this country and of the Wilson administration, and no paper in England has done more to assist America's entrance into the war. Indeed the Nation might well claim a triumph for its policy. Yet in the very moment when its faith in America is most completely vindicated, Americans are informed that they cannot read the Nation because it would contaminate them. It is a grave discourtesy to the American government, an act unworthy of an ally, and a complete blunder. Those Americans who read the Nation are not a great number, but they are influential. They will assume that the Nation's criticisms of Mr. Lloyd George's government are responsible for the suppression. Naturally they will assume the worst. They will say that something must be going so wrong that Americans dare not be informed about it. If the present British government had set out deliberately to put itself under suspicion it could not have done so more effectively.

SINCE an emergency is often made the reason for hastily sweeping aside anything that seems obstructive to the accomplishment of a single end, the present situation is apt to encourage the breakdown of various standards which it has taken years to establish. One code which is early threatened is the body of Civil Service regulations. Experience at the time of the Spanish-American war shows what can happen. In the haste to build the necessary administrative organization, the competitive restrictions in different branches were set aside and a great number of politically chosen appointees were rushed into office. Later on many of them were " covered " into the classified service by one statute or another. In the present instance Congress should make sure that there are not enough applicants already on the certified lists before it sweeps away the slowly won standards.

IT is evident from Mr. Root's speech and from editorials appearing in the party papers that the Republicans have decided to abandon the agitation for a coalition Cabinet. That agitation never took account of the fact that coalition under a party government merely divided responsibility and stifled criticism. A patriotic and candid opposition is extremely important, in that it presents the country with a real alternative when one is needed. We shall get along far better by putting full responsibility upon the Democrats for the direction of the war and equally full responsibility upon the Republicans for cordial support whenever possible and a positive substitute where differences of policy exist. The maintenance of party lines does not apply, of course, to positions below Cabinet rank. There the nation will expect the administration to select men without regard to party. As the organization of the government is now shaping itself the actual technical management of the war is to be concentrated in the National Council of Defense, related in matters of large policy to Congress and the President through its Cabinet members. The necessary distinctions and connections between party government and expert administration can probably be worked out along these lines.

A REAL need of the near future is the establishment of a national organization for the protection of freedom of speech. No matter how temperate the general disposition of public opinion, and no matter how sincere the higher officials in most jurisdictions may be not to interfere with the free expression of opinion, war always brings with it a tendency to intolerance, to consider criticism of public officials and public policy so dangerous to the public welfare as to justify suppression. Over-zealous officials are prone to strain the administration of the laws and to include under the condemnation of a penal statute many expressions of opinion which are innocent and perhaps useful attempts to arouse opposition to the government. If there is an organization in existence which will guarantee to every person arrested for alleged violation of the laws controlling public utterance his full legal rights, these officials are likely to be more circumspect in their activities. Such an organization should not be composed exclusively or preponderantly of people who are opposed to American participation in the war. It can claim and should receive the support of liberals of all degrees of belligerency, who agree in believing that the utmost practicable freedom of expression is necessary.

THERE is published elsewhere in this issue the result of an investigation made by Mr. William Hard on the number and equipment of the small boats now possessed by the American navy, which are capable of being used as submarine chasers. The investigation indicates a rather inferior state of preparation in this respect, and some question may be raised as to the propriety of publishing these facts at the present time. The answer to such questions is sufficiently obvious. The facts are to a large extent a matter of public record, and those which are not on record have been furnished for publication by officials in the Navy Department. The German government, if

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it needed such information, has long been in possession thereof. On the other hand, the American public has not been very completely informed in relation to this particular condition, and the publication of the information has a clear public value. It will increase popular support for the concentration of sufficient energy early and adequate measures to meet the deficiency.

Who Willed American Participation

PACIFIST agitators who have been so courageously opposing, against such heavy odds, American participation in the war have been the victims of one natural but considerable mistake. They have insisted that the chief beneficiaries of American participation would be the munition-makers, bankers and in general the capitalist class, that the chief sufferers would be the petty business men and the wage-earners. They have consequently considered the former classes to be conspiring in favor of war, and now that war has come, they condemn it as the work of a small but powerful group of profiteers. Senator Norris had some such meaning in his head when he asserted that a declaration of war would be equivalent to stamping " the dollar mark on the American flag."

This explanation of the great decision is an absurd mistake, but the pacifists have had some excuses for making it. They have seen a great democratic nation gradually forced into war, in spite of the manifest indifference or reluctance of the majority of its population; and they have rightly attributed the successful pressure to the ability of a small but influential minority to impose its will on the rest of the country. But the numerically insignificant class whose influence has been successfully exerted in favor of American participation does not consist of the bankers and the capitalists. Neither will they be the chief beneficiaries of American participation. The bankers and the capitalists have favored war, but they have favored it without realizing the extent to which it would injure their own interests, and their support has been one of the most formidable political obstacles to American participation. The effective and decisive work on behalf of war has been accomplished by an entirely different class—a class which must be comprehensively but loosely described as the " intellectuals."

The American nation is entering this war under the influence of a moral verdict reached after the utmost deliberation by the more thoughtful members of the community. They gradually came to a decision that the attack made by Germany on the international order was sufficiently flagrant and dangerous to justify this country in abandoning its cherished isolation and in using its resources to bring about German defeat. But these thoughtful people were always a small minority. They were able to impose their will upon a reluctant or indifferent majority partly because the increasingly offensive nature of German military and diplomatic policy made plausible opposition to American participation very difficult, but still more because of the overwhelming preponderance of pro-Allies conviction in the intellectual life of the country. If the several important professional and social groups could have voted separately on the question of war and peace, the list of college professors would probably have yielded the largest majority in favor of war, except perhaps that contained in the Social Register. A fighting anti-German spirit was more general among physicians, lawyers and clergymen than it was among business men—except those with Wall Street and banking connections. Finally, it was not less general among writers on magazines and in the newspapers. They popularized what the college professors had been thinking. Owing to this consensus of influences opposition to pro-Allies orthodoxy became intellectually somewhat disreputable, and when a final decision had to be made this factor counted with unprecedented and overwhelming force. College professors headed by a President who had himself been a college professor contributed more effectively to the decision in favor of war than did the farmers, the business men or the politicians.

When one considers the obstacles to American entrance into the war, the more remarkable and unprecedented does the final decision become. Every other belligerent had something immediate and tangible to gain by participating and to lose by not participating. Either they were invaded or were threatened with invasion. Either they dreaded the loss of prestige or territory or coveted some kind or degree of national aggrandizement. Even Australia and Canada, who had little or nothing to gain from fighting, could not have refused to fight without severing their connection with the British Empire, and behaving in a manner which would have been considered treacherous by their fellow Britons. But the American people were not forced into the war either by fears or hopes or previously recognized obligations. On the contrary, the ponderable and tangible realities of the immediate situation counseled neutrality. They were revolted by the hideous brutality of the war and its colossal waste. Participation must be purchased with a similarly colossal diversion of American energy from constructive to destructive work, the imposition of a similarly heavy burden upon

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the future production of American labor. It implied the voluntary surrender of many of those advantages which had tempted our ancestors to cross the Atlantic and settle in the New World. As against these certain costs there were no equally tangible compensations. The legal rights of American citizens were, it is true, being violated, and the structure of international law with which American security was traditionally associated was being shivered, but the nation had weathered a similar storm during the Napoleonic Wars and at that time participation in the conflict had been wholly unprofitable. By spending a small portion of the money which will have to be spent in helping the Allies to beat Germany, upon preparations exclusively for defense, the American nation could have protected for the time being the inviolability of its own territory and its necessary communications with the Panama Canal. Many considerations of national egotism counselled such a policy. But although the Hearst newspapers argued most persuasively on behalf of this course, it did not prevail. The American nation allowed itself to be captured by those upon whom the more remote and less tangible reasons for participation acted with compelling authority. For the first time in history a wholly independent nation has entered a great and costly war under the influence of ideas rather than immediate interests and without any expectation of gains, except those which can be shared with all liberal and inoffensive nations.

The United States might have blundered into the war at any time during the past two years, but to have entered, as it is now doing, at the right time and in the clear interest of a purely international program required the exercise of an intellectualized and imaginative leadership. And in supplying the country with this leadership Mr. Wilson was interpreting the ideas of thoughtful Americans who wished their country to be fighting on the side of international right, but not until the righteousness of the Allied cause was unequivocally established. It has taken some time to reach this assurance. The war originated in conflicting national ambitions among European Powers for privileged economic and political positions in Africa and Asia, and if it had continued to be a war of this kind there never could have been a question of American intervention. Germany, however, had been dreaming of a more glorious goal than Bagdad and a mightier heritage than that of Turkey. She betrayed her dream by attacking France through Belgium and by threatening the foundations of European order. The crucifying of Belgium established a strong presumption against Germany, but the case was not complete. There still remained the dubious origin of the war. There still remained a doubt whether the defeat of German militarism might not mean a dangerous triumph of Russian autocracy. Above all there remained a more serious doubt whether the United States in aiding the Allies to beat Germany might not be contributing merely to the establishment of a new and equally unstable and demoralizing Balance of Power in Europe. It was well, consequently, to wait and see whether the development of the war would not do away with some of the ambiguities and misgivings, while at the same time to avoid doing anything to embarrass the Allies. The waiting policy has served. Germany was driven by the logic of her original aggression to threaten the security of all neutrals connected with the rest of the world by maritime communications. The Russian autocracy was overthrown, because it betrayed its furtive kinship with the German autocracy. Finally, President Wilson used the waiting period for the education of American public opinion. His campaign speeches prophesied the abandonment of American isolation in the interest of a League of Peace. His note of last December to the belligerents brought out the sinister secrecy of German peace terms and the comparative frankness of that of the Allies. His address to the Senate clearly enunciated the only program on behalf of which America could intervene in European affairs. Never was there a purer and more successful example of Fabian political strategy, for Fabianism consists not merely in waiting but in preparing during the meantime for the successful application of a plan to a confused and dangerous situation.

What Mr. Wilson did was to apply patience and brains to a complicated and difficult but developing political situation. He was distinguished from his morally indignant pro-Allies fellow countrymen, who a few months ago were abusing him for seeking to make a specifically American contribution to the issues of the war, just as Lincoln was distinguished from the abolitionists, not so much by difference in purposes as by greater political wisdom and intelligence. It is because of his Fabianism, because he insisted upon waiting until he had established a clear connection between American intervention and an attempt to create a community of nations, that he can command and secure for American intervention the full allegiance of the American national conscience. His achievement is a great personal triumph, but it is more than that. It is an illustration and a prophecy of the part which intelligence and in general the " intellectual " class have an opportunity of playing in shaping American policy and in moulding American life. The intimate association between action and ideas, characteristic of American political practice at its best has been vindicated once more. The associa-

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tion was started at the foundation of the Republic and was embodied in the work of the Fathers, but particularly in that of Hamilton. It was carried on during the period of the Civil War and was embodied chiefly in the patient and penetrating intelligence which Abraham Lincoln brought to his task. It has just been established in the region of foreign policy by Mr. Wilson's discriminating effort to keep the United States out of the war until it could go in as the instrument of an exclusively international program and with a fair prospect of getting its program accepted. In holding to this policy Mr. Wilson was interpreting with fidelity and imagination the ideas and the aspirations of the more thoughtful Americans. His success should give them increasing confidence in the contribution which they as men of intelligence are capable of making to the fulfilment of the better American national purposes.

White Race Solidarity

IT was the Germans who first cried out against the infamy of her enemies in setting colored troops to fight against her. To die is to die, but to die by white if murderous hands is a fate like any other. To die by hands overpigmented is a nameless horror. Did the Senegalese and Sikhs inflict a more cruel death than the British or French in whose ranks they were fighting, or than the Germans whom they were attempting to kill? Impossible—the world's most fiendish savagery never devised pains more exquisite than those of the wounded dying of thirst between the lines of trenches. Savagery, indeed, has not often endured the sight of such miseries. Could any man of color improve upon the agonies of the victims of gas bombs, their lungs dissolving in a slow fire? Impossible. No—it is monstrous to employ colored troops not because they are especially effective instruments of death and pain, but because the death they deal is unclean. Can one expect to find his soul moving in the same white heaven if it has been torn from his body by black or brown or yellow hands?

This is race prejudice in its ultimate sublimation. But there was also a rational ground for the German protest against the employment of colored troops. It offended against the principle of solidarity of the white race. Precious solidarity, that recurrently flares up into hatreds more savage and destructive than hatreds between rival breeds of men have ever been. But it is true, there was a solidarity of a sort, in our dealings with other races. Here in North America the British and French killed their own Indians without much mutual interference. To the south of us the Spanish and Portuguese had working arrangements of slavery and extermination which the English and French did not try to thwart. French, English, Germans, Italians, Belgians, Portuguese have parceled out Africa for exploitation, and though hating one another managed down to this war to present a solidarity of oppressiveness to the people to whom the continent belonged. What happened in the East Indies from Aden to Formosa it would be revolting to recount, even if it might prove interesting. For centuries it was a view universally held among the legitimate dwellers by the Indian Ocean that a white man is a white man, and the very devil. To return to contemporary times, the Boxer expedition will prove that white race solidarity has remained a real thing, to cause other races to quake with terror. And this is the thing that the present war is destroying.

Formally, white race solidarity has been abolished. The European Entente Allies can not forget that they owe the tranquillity of their Asiatic possessions to the power and goodwill of Japan. We in the United States will presently realize how fortunate it is that Japan is on our side now, not ready to fall upon our defenseless flank. The friendly neutrality of China has given the Allied group a better understanding of China's national aspirations than could have been derived from the events of a generation of peace. India's desire for a fiscal policy that might foster her national interests now seems worth the British government's attention, though exporters protest the danger to their trade. And has not Germany herself yielded her passionate devotion to the ideal of a white man's world? What shades of color does she find revolting in her allies the Turks? And if red Mexicans and yellow Japanese were preparing to slay and lay waste on our soil, the German's sacred horror of excess pigment would hardly be invoked in our defense. The world is becoming dreadfully mixed. Soon we shall be distinguishing races by the color of their souls, instead of their skins.

And what shall we have lost with the solidarity of the white race? The worst scourge that has ever afflicted mankind. Out of this solidarity has arisen the doctrine that the colored races of the earth are as cattle, to be driven or exterminated as considerations of interest may decree. What the colored races have paid we may pass over in silence. What the white race has paid and still is paying is our immediate concern.

Why have we been fighting wars, in the last four hundred years, with a fury and persistence unexampled in earlier history? We have been dividing the spoils of the colored races. Hence the

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vast majority of our fallings out. Colonies, not bare lands where a thrifty population might find homes, but backward civilizations, with movable goods to be acquired, men to be driven, have appeared as a chief cause of almost every modern war. What item will future historians set down first in their summary of the causes of the present war? That cursed word Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia, a burning desert that might be made to yield profits to a white race, out of the sweat of a brown race.

The coming peace will not solve the "colonial question." But it will inevitably point the way. It is impossible to conceive that the peacemakers will not recognize that at least one other "colored race," the Chinese, must be admitted with full rights into the family of nations. If China is not ready, she must be assured protection and aid until her own native force can unfold. Else the yearning for colonial plunder, stunned by the war, will awaken again and China's labor power will become the bone of new and more desperate contention among the white-faced nations. The Chinese population will groan under oppression. But the heaviest price will be paid by the white races themselves, in war and preparations for war, in a social system distorted for the sake of military efficiency, in the warping of productive power to "national political" ends in place of the supplying of the needs of a pacific population. The free development of black and brown and yellow must be a primary object of international strivings, else all races must pay, the white most of all.

Conscription

THE principle of conscription for military service, tempered as far as may be by judicious methods of selection, is not one that we can expect all good citizens to accept without serious questioning. It is a horrible thing to send men into the firing line, but this is war, and war we have accepted as an evil less than the dishonor and danger that a blind and supine peace would have entailed. Is it not better that those who must risk and lose their lives for their country should do so by their own free will? Life is not equally dear to all, nor death equally terrible. Why should not the inevitable price be paid by those to whom it seems least grievous? And even if one is eager to offer freely all that he has for his country, should he not at least be permitted the fine gesture of free choice? Must coercion be applied, to cheapen his devotion?

Besides, there are those who willed this war and those who resisted it to the utmost. There are those to whom compulsion to serve in war is equivalent to compulsion to commit murder. We shall find young men subject to conscription whose next of kin are in the enemy's ranks and who must experience the ghastly misgivings of a fraticidal or parricidal enterprise. There are enough objections to conscription to make uneasy at times anyone who refuses to stupefy himself with shibboleths. If finally one is forced to accept the principle of conscription, it is because volunteering methods of filling the armies are still more evil.

Does volunteering imply the absence of coercion? In every war we have ever fought, the ranks have been filled in large part by men who have been subjected to some kind of coercion. There is coercion in the reserve power that our government has always had to draft men if necessary. Volunteer or be drafted: how much freedom does this formula contain? There is coercion in the contemptuous glances with which men, and perhaps more potently women, measure the lusty figure of the youth who hangs back from the recruiting station. The brand of cowardice is widely and indiscriminately imposed in every recruiting campaign, and it is not soon effaced. To obtain a million men by volunteering we should need to raise in five or ten million men's minds the question whether they could survive the disgrace appropriate to the slacker. And there is not the least guaranty that the men who succumb to the impulsion to enlist will be the more bellicose, the more dispensable to the community. Quite the contrary. Skilled men much needed by an industry under stress of war will join the army while loafers and bunglers will refuse service. Men who are the mainstay of dependent families will offer their lives while other men whose sole responsibility is to themselves will cynically repudiate all obligation to the country. It is in the nature of the unorganized coercion of the community to drive to the ranks those whose life experience has made them most responsive to the needs of others.

The volunteering principle rests for its effectiveness upon an unreasoning form of coercion that selects the best, the most responsible, the more socially minded, for risk of extinction. This is not all the mischief it would do in the present crisis. It is idle to assert that we are united in support of this war. There are thousands who believe that we should not have made war, and who would prefer ineffective to effective action on our part. They will do their utmost to discourage recruiting. We may be able to suppress overt anti-recruiting campaigns, but a vast deal of activity of the kind can be carried on under cover. Perhaps the movement against recruiting will prove utterly negligible. But the enemy believes that he has millions of

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friends in this country who will succeed in thwarting our national plans and restraining us from vigorous employment of our resources. If our potential power is to have weight in the calculations of Germany, we must make it clear at once that the pro-German party in this country, whether large or insignificant, can find no point at which to bring obstructive influences to bear. There must remain no possibility that pro-Germanism may nullify our efforts to raise men.

It is difficult at best to maintain a reasonable degree of freedom of opinion in a nation at war. Everyone does indeed admit the principle that the people should be kept acquainted with the general course of events. If disasters have been suffered or are impending, the people ought to know the fact, that each man may govern his action accordingly. If there is incompetence in high places, if enterprises that may prove dangerous are under governmental consideration, the people should know. To be sure, criticism of the government and its policies must necessarily be restricted in so far as military considerations dictate. But there will remain a sufficient latitude for constructive criticism if we have made sure of the requisite levies of men. If we consign our fate to the uncertainties of volunteering, any presentation of discouraging facts, any criticism of public policy becomes anti-patriotic, treasonable, perhaps. Officially we shall proceed to crush out free expression. In order that a specious freedom in recruiting may obtain, the whole people must sacrifice the freedom of thought and speech that a democracy needs most of all in time of war.

The volunteering system, never so consonant with liberty as it appears on the surface, would in the present crisis be certain to prove inimical to liberty. The system of conscription, ruthlessly executed, is patently inimical to liberty. But there is no reason why it should be ruthlessly executed. It is now generally recognized that conscription can not be applied mechanically without results prejudicial to the national welfare. There must be a wide range of exemptions not merely on grounds of physical fitness and religious opinion, but also on industrial and social grounds. Much room must be left for administrative discretion in applying any conscription law, and the fact that our men of military age vastly exceed in number any possible military requirement offers great latitude in selection. The administration now in power has proved its responsiveness to public opinion. It can be trusted to avoid methods that savor of ruthlessness. What it is possible to do to relieve conscription of harshness we can be sure the administration will do. Even so conscription may remain an evil, but the lesser evil.

A Program for Labor

MR. GOMPERS has repeatedly assured the country of the loyalty of labor. Last Monday, he recommended that the Council of National Defense should "issue a statement to employers and employees in our industrial plants and transportation systems advising that neither employers nor employees shall endeavor to take advantage of the country's necessities to change existing standards." With singular unanimity, the press has magnified this recommendation into a guaranty against strikes and all forms of industrial unrest.

But patriotic manifestos, unsupported by definite administrative plans, offer no such guaranty. Existing standards are changed day by day through the rising cost of food. Workers cannot do efficient work on a diet of loyalty. The government has entered into contracts with certain manufacturers to deliver munitions at a fixed price. These prices are based upon existing rates of wages. The contracts, which are for a definite period, apparently make no provision for an adjustment of prices to increased cost of production. Already the Department of Agriculture forecasts a serious shortage in the wheat crop. If the cost of food rises sharply, the workers in these plants may be forced to demand an increase in wages. Ought not the Council of National Defense to provide against such contingencies? Would not the government be wise to include in these contracts a provision for the establishment of joint conciliation committees upon whose recommendation the terms of the contracts might be made flexibly adjustable to changing market conditions? It was almost a year after the outbreak of war that England created her Munitions Tribunals to deal with just such problems. In their absence, strikes were frequent nothwithstanding the patriotism of labor. Ought we not to profit by England's experience?

Unless Mr. Gompers and the Council of National Defense offer specific guidance, the local and state authorities and the official representatives of organized labor are likely to repeat other well intentioned blunders that hampered England during the first eighteen months of the war. On March 28th, the New York State Federation of Labor, speaking "for the men and women, aye, and the children of labor . . . who will cheerfully make not only this but other sacrifices on our country's altar" gave advance approval to the suspension of "those statutes that safeguard our industrial population." A few days later, a bill appeared in the state assembly designed to sweep away all restrictions, not only upon the employment of men, but also upon the hours and night work of women and children. This is sheer bathos

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of misguided sentiment. The experience of England proves that men who work overtime and especially those who sacrifice their one day of rest in seven suffer a steady loss of productive capacity. The records of the English factory inspectors show that for the coldly practical purpose of sustained output, night work for women and children is bad policy. One manager reported that fatigue prevented many of the women from making the effort to go from their work to the mess-room. In another factory, also visited at night, several women spent the meal hour lying beside their piles of heaped-up work, while others were later found asleep beside their machines. "Taking the country as a whole," says the English Health of Munition Workers' Committee, "we are bound to record our impression that the munition workers in general have been allowed to reach a state of reduced efficiency and lowered health which might have been avoided" by reasonable precautions.

We shall blunder seriously if we proceed on the assumption that our factory laws were designed to hamper employers in the efficient conduct of their business. They are founded not on sentiment but on science and economic intelligence. Health and efficiency alike depend upon their enforcement. For this reason, it would be practical folly to entrust their suspension to well meaning amateurs. No modifications, even for short periods, should be permitted except upon the advice and under the control of physiological experts. The industrial army needs its trained medical corps quite as much as the regiments at the front.

As precautionary measures against labor unrest and deterioration, we venture the following suggestions:

1. Conciliation or adjustment committees should be established in all government plants and in all private plants under contract with the government. Upon these committees, employers and employees should have equal representation. It would be their duty to deal with disputes at the original point of friction. In case of their inability to bring about a satisfactory adjustment, appeal should be taken to a Conciliation Board expressly provided by the Council of National Defense.

The urgent need for some such machinery is shown by the history of a strike reported last week from Memphis, Tennessee. The Continental Piston Ring Company manufactures piston rings for aeroplanes used at the government aviation school. The federal court granted an injunction restraining the leaders in charge of the strike from interfering with the operation of the plant. "Federal agents," says the news item, "have started an investigation and arrests may follow if it can be shown that the strike was called with a view to embarrassing the company in filling war orders." Nothing is said about wages, hours or other conditions of employment. No reference is made to any possibly valid grievance of the workers. Are detectives and injunctions the best means of developing the loyalty of labor? At this time of national tension would not a system of coöperative adjustment and conciliation be a better risk?

2. A Health Conservation Board, corresponding to the General Munitions Board announced last Tuesday by the Council of National Defense, is imperatively needed to supervise health conditions in government plants and to coöperate with similar state boards in the regulation of private plants under contract with the government. Dr. Frederick Martin of the Council of National Defense is thoroughly qualified to head such an organization. No labor laws should be suspended or modified except after investigation and approval by this body of experts. Indeed, it would be to the best interest of the nation if the government could be persuaded to make minimum standards of hours, wages and shop conditions integral parts of all munition contracts. In wartime the workers will be willing to forego comforts and to work nearer the margin of physical exhaustion than in times of peace, but the country cannot afford the extravagance of paying for work done during incapacity from fatigue or the further extravagance of urging armies of workmen toward relative incapacity by neglect of proved physiological law.

No doubt the Council of National Defense has some such program under consideration. Judging from the experience of England, the effect of measures such as we have suggested would be a great increase in the volume and continuity of output. They would provide a substantial safeguard against industrial unrest.

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Our Submarine Chasers

BY this time the public eye sees hundreds and even thousands of small boats—regular navy ones and private auxiliary ones—hastening up and down our coasts from Bath, Maine, to Galveston, Texas, shooting the periscopes off submarines. Therefore I submit a count of what we really have and of what we are likely to get. I begin with the regular navy.

We have gunboats. We have twenty-eight gunboats. They are strong enough to kill a submarine all right because they are armed with three-pounders and six-pounders and even four-inchers. They have good teeth. But they are old. Twenty-three out of the twenty-eight were born before the Spanish War. Seven of them are "out of commission": that is, they have no crews. Two of them are "in reserve": that is, they have only about forty per cent crews. Only nineteen of them are "in full commission." And, of these nineteen, nine are in our Asiatic fleet. Moreover, almost all our gunboats are slow. Only three of them made as much as sixteen knots an hour on their original trips. We have one gunboat building. She was authorized on August 20th, 1916. The last Navy List reports her with the double goose-egg. She is "Building, 0.0 per cent Complete." We shall not see many submarines slain by gunboats. They are not fit for this job.

Next we have "torpedo boats." They should be distinguished from destroyers. Destroyers, really modern ones, have a full-load displacement of from about 900 to about 1,300 tons. These "torpedo boats" have a full-load displacement of from about 125 to about 375 tons. They are bantams. That, however, is nothing against them. They are larger than our new projected official special "submarine chasers." And they are fast. They made from 24 to 30 knots an hour on their trial trips. But they are not youthful any more, as a class. Only two of them were launched as lately as 1901. They seem to be regarded as generally senile. Four of them are "out of commission." Eleven of them are "in ordinary": that is, they have only about twenty-five per cent crews. One of them is in "reserve." Out of a total of seventeen, just one is "in full commission." Clearly the navy has not thought it worth while to get these boats ready to go out trawling for German tin-fish.

Our next class is called by the navy "Destroyers not Serviceable for Duty with the Fleet." They were launched in 1900, 1901 and 1902. They are intermediate in size between "torpedo boats" and fleet-serving destroyers. They are not too old; and they are fast. They all made twenty-eight or twenty-nine knots an hour on trial. They can be used in one way and another. But what has actually been done to get them ready? There are sixteen of them. Eight of them are "in reserve." They have not had full crews practising. Big boats like "armored cruisers" which are of no particular use to us in the war which has been impending over us for two years have had full crews practising. These small and potentially useful boats have not. That accounts for half of the sixteen. The remaining eight have been kept far away from any possible concerted practice against submarines in the Atlantic. Three of them are in the Pacific fleet. Five of them are with the Asiatic fleet, where they defy von Tirpitz's veterans to break through their cordon and sink the Brooklyn, their revered twenty-one-year-old first-class-cruiser flagship. Our sixteen "Destroyers not Serviceable for Duty with the Fleet" may conceivably be serviceable for various near-shore duties against submarines; but we are not likely to see them dashing into port with scalps at their bows at any early moment.

We next come to our real fleet-serving destroyers. There are fifty-one of these. One is "out of commission" and two are "in ordinary"—which leaves forty-eight. Seventeen of these forty-eight were scheduled in the last Navy List as "operating with reduced complements." That means along about sixty per cent crews. I repeat that we have found full crews for many boats of no genuine prospective use in our prospective war but we have been unable to find full crews for many boats genuinely prospectively useful indeed.

Our fleet destroyers are splendid boats. All of them, except the three that are "out of commission" and "in ordinary" are attached to our Atlantic fleet. That includes the seventeen which have been "operating with reduced complements" as well as the thirty-one which are "in full commission." We have forty-eight excellent destroyers where they belong—in the Atlantic. The trouble is that our first-class all-big-gun battleships, if they ever move out of enclosed waters at all even for necessary occasional battle practice in the open sea, will want all—or almost all—of these destroyers with them. We may be permitted to imagine, perhaps, that in certain circumstances a certain number of fleet-serving destroyers might be free to undertake a little anti-submarine activity for the protection of our commerce along our rather prolix coast from Canada to Mexico. But those certain

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circumstances and that certain number of destroyers would surely be uncertain in the extreme.

There is one remaining group of full-sized regular-navy boats especially suited to the rapid protection of commerce. It is a group called "scouts." There are three of them—the Chester, the Birmingham and the Salem. They are third-class cruisers tagged as "scouts" because of their speed. Among all our cruisers of all classes they are the only ones that made as much as twenty-four knots an hour on their trials. They are only ten years old. Each of them is assigned, under our published mobilization-stations plan, to be the flagship of one of our three flotillas of destroyers. But the Chester is "in reserve," and the Birmingham is "in reserve" and "under repairs," and the Salem is "out of commission." It is clear that they are not exactly straining at the leash with every muscle massaged to the minute. Moreover, if they were all fitted to go to sea and if they could be spared from their duties as flotilla flagships, they are quite too large to be risked on anti-submarine work. They are vessels of a full-load displacement of more than 4500 tons.

So we come to our new experiments. For a long time these experiments were confined to boats of pygmy size. Shortly after the war broke out Mr. William Washburn Nutting of the magazine called Motor Boat printed a picture of a very tiny motorboat furiously demolishing a periscope with gunfire from her hooded prow. This admirable prophecy was soon brought to a certain sort of general fulfilment on the other side of the Atlantic. Though motorboats might not demolish periscopes every minute, they were seen to have their uses—important uses. Our navy showed interest. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary, showed particular and enthusiastic interest. We placed orders (experimental ones) with our motorboat-building yards calling upon them to show ingenuity in meeting our specified needs. In the end we sanctioned a forty-five foot boat from the Lawley yard in Massachusetts and a fifty foot boat from the Greenport yard in Long Island and a sixty-six foot boat from the Luders yard in Connecticut and, from the yard of Murray and Tregurtha in Massachusetts, four or five venomous little things called "Viper Sea Sleds" which look like aborted barges and have noses as broad as their bellies and can make as much as forty knots an hour.

This was the era of boats not only pygmy in size but meteor in speed. It was the "wasp" era. We were to have a fleet of "wasps." And we could to-day make considerable use of a fleet of specially designed and specially strong "wasps" for in-shore quiet-water protective patrol work. We did not get it. We did not even get all the few individual experimental boats for which we placed orders. The Luders boat had trouble with its engines; and the Greenport boat, too, had trouble with its engines; and they have never been accepted. There is a fatality about the specifications drawn up by Washington for the things it wants to buy. The Greenport yard can get engines that will go for foreign governments in boats that it sells to foreign governments; but it cannot get engines that will go properly for Washington. This cannot be because Washington is in America. Our navy has just bought a little sixty foot boat called the Chingachgook. It was built by the Greenport yard. But it was built purely privately. It was built, and we looked at it, and we bought it, and we have it. The one ordered specially for us a year ago we have not. The only notable result of the "wasp" era in the tale of ships in our regular public fleet, at the time we declared war on Germany, were the four or five "sea sleds," the Lawley forty-five footer and the Chingachgook.

By that time we had gone on into our second and final era, in which we transferred our main interest to a boat much larger than a "wasp" and much slower. But, before speaking of that boat, we should pause to notice the popular notion that we can get "auxiliary" submarine-chasers by the myriad out of our great privately-owned fleet of pleasure motor-craft. It is a notion demonstrably erroneous.

Franklin D. Roosevelt has been as enthusiastic about small boats as anybody in the United States. From the beginning, so far as an outsider can make out, he has been a vigorous supporter of any and all means of getting ready to hit the submarine in the open sea and in bays and gulfs and sounds and narrows and rivers and rivulets. He is an effective young man because, among other reasons, he is an optimistic young man. Yet even he was obliged to tell the yacht-owners of New York that a motorboat, to be an "auxiliary," should be at least forty feet long. Now how many motor-boats have we that are forty feet long? A large number. The Yacht register says 1275. But where does that get us?

Let us assume that every one of these 1275 boats, by the imposition of a three-pounder on its usually frail and at present utterly unsuitable deck, could be transformed into a real "wasp" with a real sting. Some twenty-five ready-made real "wasps" do indeed already exist among them. They were specially built by patriotic sporting owners on special designs officially approved by the Navy Department. Let us assume that all the rest of them can be "wasps," too. It is a frantic assumption. The mass of these boats will never strike a submarine in their lives. They may render

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invaluable non-combatant service; and we must have them; and they will deserve, and already have, our most grateful thanks; but it is only a small minority of them that ever will or ever can be real fighters. Let us, however, assume. Let us see 1275 "auxiliary" submarine-chasers. Where are we then?

We are mostly in harbor. A boat has to be much more than forty feet long to be able to go after submarines in the open sea. The boats sent to England so numerously by our Elco yard for anti-submarine purposes are eighty-five feet long. The best technical naval opinion is that they should have been longer. That is why our new projected final submarine-chaser is one hundred and ten feet long. It is a boat of special design, of special shape and strength and general fitness for this special work, and yet it has to be one hundred and ten feet long. How many of our private motor-boats are as much as one hundred feet long? Fifty-one. How many are as much as eighty feet long? One hundred and sixty-six, altogether. We shall see no avenging hordes of converted motor-boats dashing around Cape Hatteras and Cape Cod day and night hunting submarines through Atlantic storms. They simply cannot do it. They will help us in-shore to be safe. Few of them, very few, will help us do the one thing we must in the end do—down our enemy in the open sea.

Surely it is manifest that our one hope is our official future one-hundred-and-ten foot boats. I here ask just one question about these boats. How many of them are we going to get? It is understood that the Navy is laying down several score of them in its own yards. The private builders, when they met in Washington, were inclined to think, when most hopeful, that they could furnish 116 of them by the first of next January. Let us double their hopefulness. Let us even treble it. We shall still be dealing, public yards and private yards together, in mere hundreds.

Is it not clear that if we continue to deal in mere hundreds, we might almost as well have stayed out of the war? Four or five hundred submarine-chasers by the first of next January will not do much more than safeguard our own coast. To defeat Germany in a reasonable length of time we must swamp the German submarine; and, to swamp the German submarine, we must deal in thousands of submarine-chasers—literally and inevitably thousands. And we must go where the submarines are. They are, and always will be, at their thickest and at their most damaging to our commerce and to our peace in the waters about the island on which live those most disagreeable persons the British. Unless we plunge in alongside those most disagreeable persons and proceed to swamp submarines where submarines are, with anti-submarine craft of all types needed, in thousands as required, we shall find next January that the German submarine commanders, so far as anything that we have done is concerned, are just as strong against the world and against the United States as they are to-day.

To change that prospect, it is becoming evident, as I shall try to show in my next article, that we shall have to undertake a deep reorganization of our conceptions of policy and of our methods of organization for manufacture.

WILLIAM HARD.

A Clue

JOHN DEWEY writes that "intellectual advance occurs in two ways. At times increase of knowledge is organized about old conceptions . . . at other times the increase of knowledge demands qualitative rather than quantitative change; alteration not addition." Some such radical change is occurring in political thought. We are being forced to organize our research and speculation around a new series of questions. It is possible, even, to attempt a statement of what those questions are.

They are raised on the front page of every newspaper. When the railroad brotherhoods threaten to strike at a moment of great peril, when national prohibition is forced upon unwilling communities, when we have to face the question of Ireland and Ulster, of the Empire and the Dominions and the dependencies, of Austria-Hungary and its subject nationalities, of the conscientious objector, of the hyphenate, of a Catholic church in a national state, we are confronted with issues which have arisen before but have never been so acute and so central. They have overthrown the simple dogmas of archaic political theory, and put the intellectual problem which is, I think, certain to preoccupy the thinking of the next generation.

That this is happening can be shown by many little signs. The dying words of Miss Cavell showed it. Mr. H. G. Wells's discovery of God as political king of the world is a symptom, for Mr. Wells has found or invented a God under whom all lesser allegiances can be coördinated. The same question is put to us in very different form by Mr. Harold J. Laski in his book The Problem of Sovereignty, and answered by a courageous assertion that the state is not absolute but plural and that allegiance in the modern world is necessarily experimental and federal.

The problem before us is to invent the machinery, methods of thought, and educational practice by which such federal citizenship can be made

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workable. Without it there is no decent solution possible of the issues raised by class, nationality, religion, and imperial expansion. How, for example, shall a man distribute his available energy between a league of nations, the government at Washington, his state government, his city, his neighborhood, his family, his church, his vocation? That he owes some loyalty to each, few will deny. That he cannot be effectively loyal to all at the same time is obvious. He cannot be because the interests of his different associations may conflict, and because the sheer limitation of time will prevent him from acting effectively in all the spheres of his devotion.

Not only do lack of time, energy, information narrow the effectiveness of citizenship, there is also, I suspect, a deeper difficulty in our own psychological constitutions. Emotionally we are not at ease when the source of authority is distributed. A divided will is likely to be an ineffective one. That is why instinctively every association into which we are grouped tends so rigorously to insist on unqualified allegiance. The leaders of a church, a trade union, a nation are fully aware of the restlessness and unaccountability which comes from plural loyalty. All, therefore, tend to make a religion of their purpose because only by the absolute capture of the soul can they be sure of their foundations. Thus the question of an eight-hour day, becomes, as one of the brotherhood chiefs stated, a dogma which is beyond investigation.

It will be the business of political science in the next years to examine the psychic sources of this political monism. What Mr. Laski says about the necessary pluralism of modern sovereignty is an unanswerably accurate description of the demands that are placed upon us. He is right in saying that this is the kind of world we live in, and much of the energy of political thought will have to go into still more elaborate description and classification of the varieties of political need. But supplementing it there will have to be analysis of the personal response to such a pluralism.

In the orthodox view allegiance is either to this or that. It is the church or the government, the city or the state, the class or the community, the nation or the world. We are supposed to choose absolutely one horn of the dilemma. But if the modern world is to be controlled, the dilemmas themselves have to be abolished and forms of coöperative allegiance devised. We have as yet only the very vaguest notions as to how this is to be done and the matter is entirely in the realm of experiment and research. But before we are through with it we shall see, I think, a transvaluation of values as radical as anything in the history of intellect. Concepts like liberty, equality, democracy, representative government will have to be reëxamined as fearlessly as religious dogmas were in the nineteenth century. We do not know what we shall turn up by ploughing deeply into these ideas. But we may expect a fertility of invention from it. This war and the peace which will follow are the stimulus and the justification.

We are living and shall live all our lives now in a revolutionary world. That means among other things a world of restless experiment. If this activity is to be controlled by mind, our minds will have to be controlled by some great central idea. That idea may be described as the search for the ways and means towards new and more workable varieties of federalism. We might almost say, I think, that there is no form of inquiry into human need and organization which could not profitably be directed for the near future by that dominant idea.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

A Few Parodists

PARODY is the last refuge of the dogmatist. It is easy for us nowadays to smile or to turn up our noses at people who say that Keats is a greater poet than Shelley, or that Shelley is greater than Keats. Most of us admit that a critic has not told us anything when he uses "greater" in this careless way and then stops. If he goes on and gives reasons, if he trots out standards and other lumber, we usually wish he had not gone on. Even when the critics are interesting great men, even when Matthew Arnold tells us why Wordsworth and Byron are the greatest English poets of the nineteenth century, or when Swinburne replies that these places are reserved for Shelley and Coleridge, the critic's conclusions are the last thing we read him for.

Late in my teens, when I was carefully shedding the religious tenets of my ancestors, elderly relatives would warn me that the fate of anybody who stopped being a Christian was to become grossly and crudely superstitious. They were wrong. With one exception my intimate friends are not Christians, yet none of these is more superstitious than the ordinary churchgoer. But dogmatism dies harder than superstition. I should deem myself old-fashioned and arrogant if I dogmatized about poets in general, yet I cannot talk or think of parodists without being dogmatic.

All authors may be divided into those who cannot be parodied, those whom parody does not hurt, and those whom parody kills or disables. Examples of the first class are Milton, Mr. Shaw and

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Mr. Finley Peter Dunne. Nobody has parodied Milton. Mr. J. C. Squire in Tricks of the Trade and Mr. Max Beerbohm in A Christmas Garland have failed with Mr. Shaw. Mr. Owen Seaman's Mr. Dooley is one of his least successful imitations. Henry James has been exquisitely parodied by Mr. Seaman, still more subtly by Max, yet the damage done him was nil. After you have chuckled over the Wells in A Christmas Garland or Mr. Squire's Wells in Tricks of the Trade you turn to a new novel by Mr. Wells with undiminished pleasure. For specimens of the parody that kills I should go again to A Christmas Garland, to the imitation of Mr. Arthur Christopher Benson called Out of Harm's Way. How can readers who were blind to the streak of comic fatuity in Mr. Benson help seeing it after it has been pointed out to them by Max? Certain things I never cared for in Mr. Masefield's narrative poems will trouble me still more, I am afraid, now that I have read Mr. Squire's The Poet in the Back Streets.

It has long been the custom to put Calverley and J. K. Stephen at the head of modern parodists. In Calverley's case the custom is good as well as old, for his high spirits, his music, and the abounding ease with which he pulls off the most difficult rhymes, make his verses prodigious fun even for readers who do not know much about the authors he imitates. This is the plight of most younger American readers of Calverley. They recognize The Cock and the Bull as Browning, of course, and Wanderers as Tennyson. But how many are familiar with Christina Rossetti or Jean Ingelow? How many remember anything about Martin Farquhar Tupper except that he was an awful ass in his day? No matter. "'Lind is the name of the Hebrew race; so is Mendelssohn, the son of Almonds: so is Rosenthal, the valley of the Roses: so is Löwe or Lewis or Lyons or Lion. The beautiful and the brave alike give cognisances to the ancient people: you Saxons call yourselves Brown, or Smith, or Rodgers,' Rafael observed to his friend; and, drawing the instrument from his pocket, he accompanied his sister, in the most ravishing manner, on a little gold and jewelled harp, of the kind peculiar to his nation." You can enjoy this passage from Novels by Eminent Hands although you have never read Coningsby. That is a virtue of all Thackeray's parodies. So with Calverley.

But why is J. K. Stephen ranked so high? He wrote one perfect imitation of Browning's mere manner, the verses beginning "Birthdays? Yes, in a general way." He did an amusing Last Ride Together from Her point of view, made that very popular joke about Mr. Kipling—"When the Rudyards cease from Kipling,"—wrote a funny Wordsworth sonnet, several other goodish parodies, a fair amount of remarkably neat and otherwise unremarkable light verse. Mr. Owen Seaman may have written nothing better than Stephen's best Browning, but he has written many parodies quite as good. His Henry James, I think in Borrowed Plumes, is unbeatable as a caricature of James's sentence-structure and movement. No one else has written so many good parodies in verse. He ranks below Calverley because his temperament is not so genial, his nonsense not so rich and because his poems do not stick in one's memory like Calverley's.

Mr. Max Beerbohm's is a dryer, finer art than Calverley's or Thackeray's, tighter-lipped, more disinterested, practised with a more fatal justice. He can inlay passages which reproduce Mr. Galsworthy's beauty in his caricature of Mr. Galsworthy's attitude toward life. What Mr. Seaman did for Henry James's manner Max has done, in The Mote in the Middle Distance, for both manner and point of view. No other parody is so dexterous and so subtle as his best things, which are also acute critiques of contemporary modes of seeing and feeling the world.

Mr. J. C. Squire, already famous in England, not so well known here as he certainly will be, is a facile, hit or miss parodist. His Tricks of the Trade, lately published in London by Mr. Martin Secker, contains both misses and hits. He seems to write his best and his least good things carelessly and easily, for the fun of writing them, and then to hurry along to other work. On his day Mr. Squire writes capital parodies like his Mr. Wells, and a friend who is better-read than I tells me that Mr. Squire has made another perfect score off Mr. W. H. Davies. The Masefield, less good as mere imitation, is nevertheless very successful as a revealer of the parodied author's weaknesses. From these heights Mr. Squire declines to his Byron, which several parodists could have done about as well, to Swinburne, which is so-so, and to Henry James, which barring a wonderful sentence or two is a sad affair. But read this stanza, from a poem which is not parody, or meant to be, called If Gray Had Had To Write His Elegy In the Cemetery of Spoon River Instead Of In That Of Stoke Pogis:

> Here where the flattering and mendacious swarm
> Of lying epitaphs their secrets keep,
> At last incapable of further harm
> The lewd forefathers of the village sleep.

The whole poem is better than any extract. It will divert everybody who knows the Elegy and has read the Spoon River Anthology.

Q. K.

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Raising Armies

WHEN the present war began my seminary of students of history started a study of the methods of raising troops in the North during the Civil War. At the same time I began to look into the results of conscription in the South. The conclusions I am about to set down were reached in the course of these studies.

The object of all the three systems tried in the Civil War—volunteering, draft, conscription, each with several modifications—was the raising of a temporary army. There was no intention of increasing the regular army to any considerable extent.

In both North and South the first system was volunteering pure and simple, organized by the state governments. In 1863 the North adopted the draft in the hope of stimulating volunteering. It was to be enforced only in those communities which had not furnished their quota. It allowed money commutation for service, which naturally angered the laboring class. It encouraged communities to bid against each other in order to fill up their quotas and avoid the draft. Rich communities bought the boys from poorer ones, and all over the country men were selling themselves for bounties. Some jumped their service after receiving the bounty, and at least one boat load of Irish lads was brought over by speculators who planned—I am glad to say they failed—to sell them to the recruiting officers. The draft supplied only 61,950 men out of about two million and a half enlistments. It was undoubtedly the worst of the three systems.

In a country where the only national officials off the sea-coast were judges and postmasters, and nearly all the latter in 1861 new to their jobs, the wise men of the North did not try conscription. In the South, which turned to conscription in 1862, it was only moderately successful. There was political wrangling over exemptions. Even though enforced service could be avoided by volunteering first, conscription could not work with clock-like regularity in a community of southern individualists.

I began my studies with as firm a belief in the volunteer system as is proper for a historian before investigating a subject. I have not only changed this opinion, but come to believe that the experience of the Civil War, which neither proves nor disproves that conscription is undesirable or un-American, does positively prove the undesirability of the mixed draft and volunteer system.

For a close study of volunteering reveals not merely its disadvantages, but still more emphatically its delusions. The absence of a conscription law merely lets loose a crowd of other compelling forces, which lash with scorpions where the law uses but rods. Scorpions, that is, for the sensitive, while the toughened go scot free. The first call for volunteers in a great national emergency brings out the adventurous and devoted who really want to fight. They amount to about one per cent of the population. Many of them ought not to go. Generous of themselves, they sacrifice families and positions where many of them would be more useful than at the front. They contain among them a large proportion of the spiritual and intellectual cream of the nation. The choicest are plunged into those holocausts which lack of experience provides at the beginning of each war. When they have gone, begins the process of rasping the nerves of those who do not want to go, who are willing but not anxious to go. Orators and preachers, press and posters make life a burden. Vituperative spinsters and senseless but entrancing chits of girls gall those who should go and those who should not, alike. They have no regard for family burdens, for the reticence that causes men to conceal a physical disability. Like hornets they sting the slackers in a service which other propagandists, pursuing other methods, are representing rather as a reward than as a duty, and using all the pigments of Aristotle to paint as it isn't. The state, having left to the individual the decision of the momentous question of where he owes his duty, stimulates the tormentors who make an intelligent decision impossible. All the license of unbridled individualism riots through a close-knit community where each bitter speech and ill considered slur gains force by endless repetition. And yet this process fails of the necessary efficiency. The sensitive, the vain, the morbid, and many of the conscientious yield, but the obstinate resist. They are married and all the unmarried have not gone, they are thirty and all those of twenty-five have not gone. Shall they go for a pittance when fortunes are making at home? They voted against war, let those who favored it go first. Carried to the extreme pitch of virulence, with patriot and fakir working side by side, with all the apparatus of modern publicity, these "free will" agencies seem able to add from five to six per cent to the original one per cent. A sense of injustice keeps many a brave man and good soldier from the field.

In many cases the percentages mentioned should be enough, and I long clung to the idea that selec-

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tion by such natural processes would be the result of natural conditions, and that, therefore, it would respond to the needs of readjustment in a nation at war, that industries not needed would furnish the recruits, that war industries would check the tide of enlistment by higher wages. The total failure to find a superior flexibility under the volunteer system has not converted me to socialism. Natural forces require time to work out their adjustments; war demands quick adjustment. I now marvel at the results attained by such a process, rather than feel surprised that those results do not surpass or equal those where the adjustment is a matter of law. And how natural are those processes? The crowd that jeers the slacker takes less account than the law of the economic need for those they jeer at, they cheer to the skies many in uniform who should be at desk and forge. The fear of a man that his wife will not respect him is more potent than the arguments which intelligence marshals to keep him at home.

War is for everyone a period of tense nerves, the mere nerve strain breaks many in home and camp, millions are near the breaking point. Is it efficient to add to the peak load that every thinking individual is carrying, the necessity of deciding how he can best serve his country, at a time when he cannot know the conditions which should control his decision, and must decide in a din? The cost of a volunteer system in wasted nervous energy at a time when all nervous energy is needed, is of itself enough to condemn it, now that we possess a government competent to take the burden from the individual.

Nor can a volunteer system be defended on the score of military effectiveness. In these days of rigid military training, who has failed? Doubtless when the war is over we shall hear tales of cowardice, but it is sufficiently evident that trained men under modern conditions fight with a surprising equality of doggedness. The best thing to be said of the draft is that in the Civil War the drafted men were especially commended.

The bee hive has no attraction for me, but I think the man with historical training is little inclined to dismiss measures of present practical utility for fear they will lead to some loathed end. Counter currents have always checked such developments before the reductio ad absurdum is reached. I don't want universal military service as a permanent part of our life, but now that we are going to war let us remember, before we have to learn, that war is a serious business; let us be businesslike, let us cut out the fuss and feathers, let us deprive the ranting military glory vocalist of his chance, by quietly informing everyone what is his duty, and letting the will of the people rather than the goad of the individual hold everyone to it.

While waiting for this article to be typewritten, I took up the Chicago Herald of March 30th, 1917, and read: "The success of the recruiting campaign yesterday was attributed largely to the 'beauty squad' . . . Four of the girls belong to the Frolic Social Club."

CARL RUSSELL FISH.

At the Capitol

IN authorizing the President to proceed with "the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the government" to a successful termination of the war, it is not the general expectation of members of Congress that they are in the future to play a passive and perhaps not even advisory rôle. Most of those who spoke against war professed their support, once war had been declared; but a much larger number made it clear that not without vigorous resistance would Congress limit itself to a money-voting coöperation. Thus Mr. Lenroot, one of the few members with influence on both sides of the House, insisted that immediately following a declaration of war "we must exercise our constitutional duty in determining for ourselves what we think, in the interest of America, is necessary to be done, and not to follow blindly the orders of any man, even though he be the President of the United States"; and in the Senate Mr. Borah declared that in voting for war he must not be understood to "even tacitly indorse" the President's proposals for carrying it on—proposals with which he would later deal, "absolutely disembarrassed by this vote." Those who are inclined to take such warnings lightly, and to believe that the situation has slipped out of the hands of a hesitant and quarreling Congress, must bear in mind that legally it is possible for that body, by placing one rider or another in the many appropriation bills that will be necessary, to exert at least a negative influence on the strategy of war. Obviously an alert public opinion would not tolerate a clear violation of the confidence it has placed in the President; but the congressional machine seems almost consciously designed to turn clear issues into confused ones, and to permit a maximum pressure with a minimum responsibility. Even less difficult would it be to hamper the President's course by a seemingly guiltless and unavoidable delay. Opposition expressed in either of these ways would, of course, necessitate a more or less united Congress; but since opposition by a unified legislature is not impossible, it is worth while, at the beginning of the war, to understand from what sources the President's support has been drawn.

Conditions make it possible to reach a rather definite idea of what the eighty-two senators had in mind when they voted to declare war upon Germany. The nineteen men who spoke in support of the resolution included the members who customarily reflect the attitude of the various political and sectional groups in the Senate. From an examination of their very detailed arguments it appears that not more than seven of the nineteen held with the President in believing the justification of the war to be the setting up of a peace that will insure the observance of liberal principles. To most of those who spoke on the war resolution, and who have, in earlier discussions of foreign affairs, been permitted to express the sentiment

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of the Senate, the European struggle was relevant only insofar as it bore directly on the narrower principle of national honor. Aside from the few members who grasped, with the President, the opportunity that warrants extending the area of the war, the support of the resolution fell into two classes. One group, much the larger, was made up of those who regarded the war not as a struggle against a predatory autocracy, but as the only means of redress for specific and illegal violations of our rights upon the seas. These members would not realize that Germany, defeated on such an issue, can give us nothing more productive of permanent peace than what she has already given us in the Sussex pledge. Mr. Kirby, for instance, insisted that we were "not going into a world war to establish a democracy for the nations of the earth," but "to protect the lives of our people on the open sea and our commerce." This was also the position taken by Mr. Reed, Mr. Hardwick, Mr. Ashurst and other senators who are group spokesmen. Mr. Harding declared, in supporting the resolution, "It is my deliberate judgment that it is none of our business what type of government any nation on this earth may choose to have" —although the reason we are now going to war is obviously because the type of government that Germany has is an obstacle to the organization of peace. And Mr. Borah asserted that he voted for war, "joining no crusade," and solely "to use force against those who use force against us."

Showing no sounder appreciation of the causes which could justify the sacrifice of war, and offering even less promise of a constructive peace, was the position taken by those senators who supported the war resolution only to avoid the appearance of a divided front. This was the motive which led Mr. Cummins and Mr. Kenyon, both of whom opposed the arming of merchant ships, to vote with the President in this later instance. It was, in fact, the reason which induced Mr. Hitchcock to act as the official spokesman of the administration on the floor of the Senate; for he said, "I cannot at this moment cast my vote against war without doing a vain and foolish thing. My act would only serve to weaken my country in the face of the enemy and in the face of inevitable war." Certainly the attitude reflected by such a position, no less than the attempts of the larger group to vindicate a costly war solely to win a promise from Germany, does not offer much encouragement so far as the Senate goes. And not only were those who took the broad stand of the President thus outnumbered, but they were themselves on unsure ground. Senator Lodge, though certain that this must be a war upon international lawbreaking, declared his opposition to a league for preventing violations of the law —an opposition which was born suddenly, two months ago, when the President addressed the Senate on that subject; and Mr. Williams, who perhaps is as near as anyone else in the Senate to an understanding of "peace without victory," nevertheless asserted that our reply to Germany in the present instance must be: "We have got nothing to do with the question of your whipping Great Britain; you whip her all you please or can, but do not undertake to whip us while you are about it."

Incomplete as was the Senate's understanding of the President's position, the members of the House seemed even less willing or able to put the issue on the broad plane of securer international order. It is not possible to inquire so accurately into the motives that influenced them, because, in line with a well established custom, a large number of the speeches will not be printed in the Record until they have been toned, up or down, in harmony with the response which has come from the member's district. Of the seventy-eight addresses made in support of the war resolution, twenty-three have not yet been printed. The balance includes not more than a dozen that reflect a sound understanding of the President's reasoning, and these come chiefly from members who do not mould the thought or action of the House. Mr. Sherley is perhaps the only one of them who has any actual influence in debate or position of responsibility. The leaders in the House, and a majority of those who follow them, are to be found acting from motives unsympathetic to the President's stand, and of the same two sorts that explained the action of the Senate. One group of members—among them the Republican floor leader, Mr. Mann—supported the view expressed by Mr. Campbell: "If my vote against this resolution would avert war, I would vote against it. It would not. I am unwilling, therefore, that my vote should be construed as comfort to the enemy." This position, analogous to that taken in the Senate by Mr. Cummins, was the declared motive of a considerable group of representatives. But a much larger number, including the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and practically half of those who supported the resolution on the floor, explicitly limited the scope of the war to a retaliation for submarine injuries. The view of these members was expressed briefly by Mr. McCulloch: "I believe that we should enter this war merely for the purpose of protecting our rights, and when we succeed in forcing Germany, if we should so succeed, in recognizing our rights on the seas and in modifying her submarine warfare, then we should withdraw and have nothing further to do with the controversy."

Certain sections and groups of people are only now realizing the opposition from Congress that threatened any vigorous action on the part of the President during the month of February. That opposition was sincere enough to be still living. At the beginning of the war the President finds himself with the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voting against a declaration; the ranking Democratic member of the Committee supporting it chiefly to avoid a split; the ranking Republican member opposed to the construction of an organized peace; and both the majority and the minority leaders in the House disagreeing sharply with the considerations that led the President to his decision. It would be unwarranted to assert that these men, though they are the very ones who must guide the coöperation of Congress, can shift the President from his high position. But it would be equally unwarranted to believe that through a long trying period they can coöperate with him whole-heartedly. An early willingness on their part to yield must not remove them from the careful observance of those who share the President's understanding of the purposes for which we are going to war.

C. M.

An Acknowledgment

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A COMMUNICATION

The Value of Common Experience

SIR: When I came to America, I did not know that I should be present during one of the most decisive periods in the history of these States. Now I wish to point out, in terms of the near future, what seems to be a striking consequence of the actual crisis.

This crisis is bringing to the people of America a moral experience which can be compared with that which came to the people in France, in August, 1914. Of course, the experience of American citizens and even of American soldiers will never be the same as that of the Europeans. But similarly the English experience in the war is not the French one, which in turn is neither the Belgian, nor the Serbian, nor the Polish. King Albert's situation is not President Wilson's; still as a matter of fact, both took the same attitude towards the same challenge.

The United States takes its actual stand by a long considered act which consciously involves large responsibilities. And the whole country, understanding the gravity of possible consequences, is making rapid acquaintance with that "Union Sacrée" which in France was our first great positive experience in the present war.

There was until now, in spite of our common principles, one tremendous difference between us. The people of France had first to lose their feeling of security and be thrown on the battlefield. America had not even been made anxious for her safety. Now her every citizen is anxious, and thinks, and tries to find his way. And that anxiety is in itself an immense experience. Verhaeren said, five years ago,

> "L'angoisse est nécessaire aux races qui sont fortes,
> Et pour grandir encore, il leur faut le danger."

America is to-day showing herself strong and conscious in the face of danger.

Now if something great is to be realized after the war, if we are to know, as Mr. Wilson and M. Briand have said explicitly, a peace maintained by an organized international will, then the future maintainers of that peace have first to understand each other, and this implies that the terms we use have a similar sense. What understanding was possible between a European soldier with his three years of fighting in the trenches, with his experiences of danger, of anger, and of meditation in the constant face of death—and an American citizen from the West? To-day, the citizen from the West has made up his mind, has reflected on the government's reasons, and has endorsed the President's action. There was no alliance, there was no concerted action between us. But the facts are these: France which was peaceful had to mobilize against certain destructive forces. America which is peaceful has to mobilize against the same forces. Thus our effort and your effort toward peaceful life have indeed something in common, were it only the common drawback to its success. And so in the struggle to establish a lasting peace, we are already coöperating indirectly. Thus some international terms have passed from Utopia to reality. This may seem to be of little importance. Still it is capital.

Because peace will come. We must remember that to-day throughout the world a formidable and resolute will exists, almost unanimous, to guarantee that peace, in the future, against the intrigues of adventurous politics. That will exists even more firmly in the minds of those who do not express it in speeches, but are fighting for it.

In 1792 France wanted to bring liberty to the world. The world was not ready to receive it. Only the Americans, the Swiss, and the English, as nations, knew what the word itself meant. Most of the others, as the French sometime earlier, did not see anything more glorious than to belong to a prince. The world really awoke in 1848. In the same way the world of three years ago was not ripe for the general enforcement of peace. But now it is awake, dreadfully indeed, and waits for something that has to come. Will you say it is utopian, the international understanding which practically all inhabitants of the civilized world call for with all their hearts, and for which so many are dying?

Well, to obtain this result of understanding, we have to deal with terms of common significance. Until February 3rd the end of the war seemed to announce itself as the way into an obscure, uncertain period, full of debates and disagreements, where three groups of Powers would be involved, directly or otherwise: the Allies, the Central Powers, the neutrals. And what was there of common significance for those three groups of similar strength, and entirely dissimilar mentalities, experiences, and aspirations?

Now let us look at the consequence of the American intervention. America has broken with a nation that refused to respect treaties. It is not a special point of maritime right that matters here; it is a fundamental opposition of doctrine. America refuses to admit that a nation, more than an individual, might suppress a law, when that law interferes with its desires. An Austrian diplomat said: "A nation has a right to wage a preventive war." He meant the attack on Serbia. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg said: "Necessity knows no law." He meant the attack on Belgium. America stands firmly against these doctrines, or rather this destruction of all doctrines.

The French soldiers are standing against the same. For our men, with their long civic training, are not so stupid and so blind and so tame as to fight during three years of terrible and patient stuggle, without knowing why they do it. It is not for a detail, but for the most decisive principles. And if Americans go to war, it will be for similar principles, and not only to avenge a submarine commander's bloody fantasy.

And now do you see the consequence, young American, my comrade? For the future we shall have the experience, in common with the whole civilized world, of having resisted the German attempt just as we should have resisted any other: the ideas which we are fighting exist elsewhere, although they have been disappearing little by

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little. In Germany and Austria alone have they remained permanent ideas of government.

When peace comes, we shall find ourselves to be one vast group of nations (your President said a family) instead of various groups confronting each other in mistrust and misunderstanding. There will be, as there is already potentially (and this is not a dream), a single ensemble wherein at least one common fundamental idea will have been expressed, and even two. First—the will to preserve a lasting peace, and, therefore, to put into practice the necessary means, which had never been seriously considered, because of the lack of manifest faith and will on the part of the great number. Second—the common experience of what threatens peace; that is, the so-called right of the mightier, used as a state doctrine, such as is represented by imperial Germany.

What has been lacking until now is a definite, clear idea to put forth in common. Here we have two. These are enough to begin with.

There seems to me no doubt that Germany's eyes will be opened, and that she will follow, because there will be no choice for her. Perhaps she will even publish the biggest books about universal peace and the ways of preserving it. We shall see her coming slowly to understand the principles enunciated by both President Wilson and the Allies. Indeed, on February 3rd Mr. Wilson spoke not only as the leader of these states, but as a leader of civilization itself. We shall see Germany falling in line, however unwillingly, with the world. And that shall be our revenge for all the evil she has done us.

So the hideous war which began as a last attempt for domination will end as the first operation of international order and police, thanks to the common understanding wrought in the minds of the remotest themselves. Those whom long distance separates from the actual conflict are now brought to an experience comparable with that of the mobilized people of western Europe, because they have acknowledged similar moral standards, and because information travels fast. And it will be the first time that practically the whole civilized world will have done something in common, with its soul and its best forces. This involves an admirable consequence: that this world will be in active process of understanding before peace comes. Thus peace will find divergent minds already prepared to work together. Christianity itself never knew such a wide and mighty gathering under a common purpose. Now the combined forces for peace can work with the prospect of being stronger than any warlike minority that may arise; even those minorities allied together could not impose their will upon us, if *us* means the rest of the world. (It will appear some day that this was not very far from happening in 1913, as a result of the first Balkan war. But Austria's diplomacy and the world's "know-nothingism" caused the second conflict and all hopes were lost.)

I believe that it will remain the great dignity of America that she took her stand in spite of her remoteness from the major conflict, in spite of her immediate comfort perhaps; a stand worthy of nations who will tomorrow build the future, and who fight to-day, or are ready to fight, in order to render the future possible.

PIERRE DE LANUX.

New York City.

CORRESPONDENCE

Cleveland Not Fooled by Sunday

SIR: I wish to commend your reference to Billy Sunday in the last issue of The New Republic. You may be interested to know that there are some ministers who have not bowed the knee to Baal. Cleveland has turned down Mr. Sunday twice. Two years ago every kind of pressure was put forth to land him on our city, but without success. This winter another attempt was made to bring him here, but the leading churches and ministers again refused to coöperate, and the matter had to be abandoned the second time.

The Cleveland churches looked carefully into the record of Mr. Sunday's work in different parts of the country and found no substance or permanency in it. It is amazing to us here how people in other places run after him. Are the churches failing that they will turn to such a man for leadership, a man spiritually offensive, as you say, and without any intelligible philosophy, simply a ranting and incoherent exhorter?

Your suggestion that the newspapers of New York City prove to the clergymen that the way to reinstate Jesus is not by vulgarizing him, is worthy of serious consideration, and if carried out would do much to bring many churches back to a dignified and educational ministry.

EDWARD C. YOUNG.

Cleveland, Ohio.

Wants Law Against Strike

SIR: Chief Justice White in tendering his decision on the constitutionality of the Adamson law opens a door for Congress which should not be allowed to slam in its face. When he observed the following he was suggesting to Congress to pass a law actually restrictive of the right of persons employed in business of public service:

"Whatever would be the right of an employee engaged in a private business to demand such wages as he desires, to leave the employment if he does not get them, and by concert action to agree with others to leave upon the same condition, such rights are necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a business charged with a public interest."

If there is any moral or constitutional justification for expecting the concert of the judicial and legislative organs of our government, let us hope that public opinion will point out to Congress the powerful suggestion in the words of the Chief Justice.

PHILLIPS WYMAN.

Ithaca, New York.

She Foresees Blackmail

SIR: Will Katharine Anthony please explain how she is going to give the illegitimate child a father? It sounds very well to say every child should have two parents, but how is fatherhood to be proved? Is it going to be enough in this woman-worshiping country of ours for a woman merely to state that a certain man is the father of her child? Or will she have to state it under oath? Will the man's denial have any weight? I am interested to know how blackmail is to be avoided. Or are women too sweet and pure ever to descend to blackmail?

ANNIE NATHAN MEYER.

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Books and Things

BERNARD SHAW, who speaks often as a pioneer, has no doubt uttered many an opinion which will be conventional in the next age. Did he do this the other day, when he said President Wilson had not made a single mistake since the war began?

Yes, if Germany loses the war. No, if Germany wins. Such at least would be my guess at the answer, recollecting how prone every age has been to let men's good or ill fortune determine its estimate of their greatness.

No historian worth considering, none who doesn't measure Mr. Wilson by standards superhumanly high, will condemn him because he did not at the very outset foresee the coming inevitability of war between Germany and the United States. Nobody had this foresight. In August, 1914, there may have been a few Americans who wanted this country to go in. That, no matter how sincerely they may now mistake their 1914 wishes for the gift of prophecy, was a very different state of mind from knowing Germany would ultimately make it impossible for us to stay out. By all the rules of this human game we are all playing, with men and women of human size as the players, Mr. Wilson must be forgiven for his quite human inability to foresee in 1914 what he sees in 1917.

This admitted, we have still an interesting question on our hands. Mr. Wilson began by believing he could avoid war. He has ended by realizing that he could not. Did his change of mind take place reasonably early? Or unreasonably late?

Just at present we are all disposed to consider, as justifying or at worst excusing his slowness to change his mind, the outer obstacles and inner scruples that tended to retard this change. The many citizens of German birth or descent, the considerable anti-English feeling among some other Americans, the distrust of Russian autocracy felt by liberals throughout the United States—the most militarist of Presidents could not have helped seeing these things, and seeing them as increasing the chances that the United States could continue to play a lone hand. And Mr. Wilson was not militarist. He saw the conflict through the eyes of a reasoning man who hates violence, of a humane man who abhors the shedding of blood, of an orderly man disturbed by wasteful chaos, a liberal who detests the illiberal and reactionary forces which all wars release and strengthen, a liberal leader with plans that he cannot carry out unless his country remains at peace.

These things, which every one recalls who tries to explain Mr. Wilson's first mental attitude, will be remembered against him if Germany wins. His reasons for being slow to change his mind will be taken as proofs that he ought to have changed it sooner.

A resemblance between Mr. Wilson and Gladstone, as Bagehot saw him, will also count against Mr. Wilson if the submarine campaign succeeds. "On all great questions, on the controversies of states and empires," said Bagehot, "Mr. Gladstone is the most pacific of mankind. He hates the very rumor of war; he trusts in moral influences; he detests the bare idea of military preparations. He will not believe that preparations are necessary till the enemy is palpable. . . . We believe that Mr. Gladstone so much hates the bare idea of the possibility of war that after many warnings . . . he has refused to take even the contingency of hostilities into his calculations. . . . He cannot imagine that anything so coarse as war will occur; when it does occur he has a tendency to disapprove of it as soon as he can. . . . At the present moment no Englishman, not Mr. Bright himself, *feels* so little the impulse to arm."

What will be said, if the submarine campaign should turn out as von Tripitz hopes it will, by those who agree with me in thinking this bit of Bagehot fairly applicable to Mr. Wilson? Will they not say such a man was likely to cling too long to the belief that Germany might be moved by appeals to her better nature, that she would be influenced by fear of what we might do to her some day if we ever got ready? Will they not say he was too fearful of naval and military preparations, too much afraid such preparations might give Germany a pretext for aggressions of which it might afterward be said that they would never have been committed if we had not, by beginning to prepare against her, made threats? Was not a man like Mr. Wilson designed to make mistakes of just this kind?

Let us go on now from the time when Mr. Wilson thought war could be avoided to the time after he had ceased to think so. I do not know when this change of mind began or when it was completed. No one knows who is not in his confidence. But at some unknown date he found himself confronted with a new problem: he had to convince this country of the inevitability of war. His task was to do and say what would make the country as nearly united as possible on the day when war came, and as nearly prepared as possible. Such a combination—of universal, spiritual and emotional readiness with thorough military, naval, industrial and financial readiness—would have been ideal. It was also impossible. Mr. Wilson seems to have thought not only that it was impossible but that a united nation and a prepared nation were mutually exclusive. After Mr. Gerard's visit to the United States last autumn why didn't Mr. Wilson try to rouse us all to the necessity of making preparations to resist the approaching submarine ruthlessness? Because, I suppose, he was afraid his advocacy of preparing would defeat his efforts to unite the country. A country unprepared but united, a country more prepared but less united—it seems to me that Mr. Wilson saw his problem partly as that choice, and that he chose to work for the greater unity and to let the greater preparedness wait until the war began. He bought unity and paid for it with unpreparedness.

If the submarines win the war people will forget how hard was the task of persuading American democracy to prepare for a war it hoped to keep out of. They will condemn Mr. Wilson for having thought the task so difficult, so likely to divide the country, that he attempted it only in a few scattered speeches. They will forget how thoroughly his opponents failed in their more persistent attempts to perform it. Anything less persuasive, anything more unlikely to convert an American majority, than Mr. Roosevelt's preparedness propaganda it would be difficult to imagine. His obvious desire to have us enter the war showed through his declaration that Germany would have yielded to force.

All these things will turn one face to posterity if Germany loses, and a very different face if Germany wins. Can the United States begin soon enough to turn out ships that can feed England long enough for her seamen to reduce the submarine danger to unimportance? Then the next age will exalt Mr. Wilson. If we have entered the war too late and too unready the next age will deny his greatness and call his patience by another name. The one thing it will surely not do him is justice. The great war will be too near for that.

P. L.

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After the Play

NOT long after Mr. Edward Sheldon began his career he wrote a play called The Nigger, which aggregated and solidified in one production almost everything that an audience of wine agents might require in a racial melodrama. There was, as I remember it, a rape committed somewhere off stage. There was a lynching in the wings. There was the imminence of a mixed marriage, a drop of Negro blood being discovered in the hero just in time to save the white fiancée. Mobs, I recollect, rumbled around the house where the fated man was communing with his soul, and these grim deliberations ended in his renouncing the governorship to which he'd been elected and deciding to devote his life to his own people instead. Such incidents were not selected, as Mr. Thomas Dixon might have selected them, out of a large natural endowment of malignancies. Mr. Sheldon had no animus against the Negro, but, like most Americans, he had remembered his newspapers too well. The things he associated with the Negro were the copy-desk conventional things. To the Negro he could discern for himself he had turned a wall-eye.

This conventionality has its splendid reaction in Mr. Ridgely Torrence's plays which Mrs. Hapgood has just produced at the Garden Theatre. Mr. Torrence is an Ohio poet who, looking at the Negro beyond the miasma that surrounds him, has seen something so utterly different that his tenderness has occasionally got the better of him, and he has poured out his heart to the colored people like a hospitable wine. So different are the men and women and children whom Mr. Torrence has perceived for himself, it is scarcely strange that his impulse should be excessively generous, but one rejoices that this impulse enabled him to share the self-consciousness of a particular group of American citizens as it has seldom been shared before. There are three plays in the program of the Garden Theatre, the first a comedy, the second a tragedy, the third a "Passion interlude"—the incident of Simon the Cyrenian in the way of the cross. And, under the fine direction of Robert Edmond Jones, these plays are acted entirely by Negro players. What marks the occasion in spite of Mr. Torrence's sympathies and the specialty of the players, is not, however, only racial solicitude or propaganda. Not all the propaganda or solicitude on earth can add a cubit to artistic stature, and unless there is artistic stature in a theatrical production it has no excuse for existing. Its purpose may be humane, but no purpose is humane enough to justify inhumane behavior to an art. There is nothing inhumane in the behavior of Mrs. Hapgood's enterprise. It is, all things considered, as fine an enterprise as the American theatre has seen for years. It is the emergence of an artistic Cinderella into the palace where she belongs. One undiscovered country in emotional America is Negro country, and these productions have disclosed it in a fresh and vigorous and lovely way. The costumes and scenery by Mr. Jones go far toward making the performances successful, apart from the dramatist's contribution, but for myself the actors had unusual power and charm. Had the Negroes been Puritans perhaps they would not speak so musically. Thank the Lord they were not Puritans. Besides their gracious speech there is, despite much amateurishness, a real capacity for creating illusion. The performance of Miss Marie Jackson-Stuart as Granny Maumee had real limitations, but I found myself curiously thrilled whenever she raised her empty gaze and declared, "My eyes will yit behold!" Considering the other awkwardnesses in the play my responses were due, I suppose, to the adventitious eloquence of a racial identity between actor and dramatis persona. How could it help being poignant? But the artistic transportation of one's sympathies was accomplished, I think, in the first play, The Rider of Dreams.

What white man, what white magistrate even, has failed to chuckle over the Negro chicken-stealer? Mr. Torrence has taken a Negro for The Rider of Dreams who has, in some sort, this light-fingered habit, and he has made out of him the chief character in a flashing, lustrous comedy, the kind of comedy that reveals in waywardness such a riding of dreams as only a man touched with the spirit of Puck could imagine. The way Mr. Torrence has caught the poet in his Rider of Dreams, has kept the rollick and lilt of Madison Sparrow without disturbing his innocence, is a proof that with delicate art any kind of personality may be established on the stage. But in the intoxicated romance of Madison Sparrow, in the gallop of his imagination, there is no dependence on the popular idea of the Negro. Who supposes that in the whitewashed cabin, the child eating his bowl of mush, the strict woman of the house sprinkling clothes at the ironing-board to one side, a ne'er-do-well husband will scarcely start his supper before breaking out into a glorious humorous chant, at once racial and personal, which spurns the wife's leading-strings just as much as the laborious earth itself? No one reared on the fodder of newspapers is prepared for such a burst of poetry, but the domestication of it by Mr. Torrence is as completely convincing as it is enchanting. The bombast of the child is in Madison Sparrow, as one might expect, but the clouds of glory that stream from him as he wings along are too full of color and delight not to enlist the wilding in every heart. It is good luck that the part fell to an actor like Mr. Opal Cooper who could droop his wings as well as spread them, and exhibit the humor of a Sparrow's fall as well as his rise.

The tragedy of Granny Maumee does one grim service, it lifts a corner on the Negro aspect of racial hate. Here there is a reversal of that contamination which would thrill wine agents in The Nigger. The contamination that blind Granny Maumee dreads is white man's blood in a family of royal Negro blood. Mr. Torrence's invention seemed rather feeble in this tragedy, and it was hard to listen to the actress who kept saying of Mr. Lightfoot, the white villain, "He—Would—Have—His—Way." You felt sorry for her, but you wished she could command a less mechanical utterance. The white baby, too (performed by a large doll), was too reminiscent of Broadway acting to make one happy.

The emotionality of Mr. Torrence reached saturation point in Simon the Cyrenian. Why Procula (Mrs. Pontius Pilate), should have pleaded so hard for Jesus was not easy to grasp, and there was something not entirely simple about the machinery that projected Simon the Negro into prominence in the story of the Crucifixion. The symbolism of that crown of thorns which Simon also came to wear was not enough to carry the play. And is it not possible that Simon was a poor, trembling, intimidated man, on whom the soldiers laid brutal hands? This would be an irrelevant question if it were not relevant that Simon the Cyrenian provokes irrelevant questions. Its picturesqueness lifts it into interest, however, and keeps it from cancelling a theatrical victory.

F. H.

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Time: The Present

Changing Winds, a novel, by St. John G. Ervine. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.60.

IT only needed a bit of fresh evidence such as Changing Winds to confirm one's notion that a definite tendency in modern fiction is now pretty clearly established. It is that Wellsian tendency to use recent news for novels, to represent men and women as plying in the middle and muddle of those unsystematic contemporary processes which always in some measure involve ourselves. The reason for this tendency is perhaps worth enquiring, but first of all there is Mr. Ervine's performance in Changing Winds.

This novel is too lengthy and elaborate to be characterized in one crisp sentence. The chief fact about it, perhaps, is the skill with which it places Anglo-Irish and Anglo-Ulster and Ulster-Irish affairs in the middle of a sophisticated world. Mr. Ervine is the first of his generation who has, to my knowledge, successfully woven a plot to and fro between Ulster and London, Dublin and Devon. Other men, C. E. Montague in particular, and of course Bernard Shaw in John Bull's Other Island, have tried to get England and Ireland into the same plane, but the contrasts, the divergences, defeated them. If one of their people was clearly and comprehensibly inside the empire he never merged with the Irish, and if he was Irish he never entered into the spirit of the empire. It is Mr. Ervine's triumph that, as a fictional fact, his hero straddles the Irish Sea. Only an Ulster Home Ruler could have done it, but Mr. Ervine depicts him in that noble though uncomfortable posture, and it is something of which any novelist might be proud. The ultimate result is to include the Ireland of the rebellion in the British war-picture, enabling Mr. Ervine to draw on rich Ulster material as well as on Devon and London.

The best figure in Changing Winds is perhaps Mr. Quinn, a breezy Irish gentleman, who manages at once to be small landlord and agricultural reformer, Ulster Protestant and fiery lover of Ireland. It is this man's son, Henry Quinn, whose career gives the book its continuity. Mr. Quinn, senior, hates to send his boy to a public school in England where, in spite of efficient teaching, he will acquire the "finicky bleatin'" that is the Ulsterman's characterization of an English accent. At his public school, however, Quinny becomes one of a Heavenly Quartet; later, after graduation from Cambridge, to be the nucleus of the Improved Tories, a group of English youths who go in for plain talking and high thinking and intend to combine an exceedingly stylish radicalism with Great Careers. There is nothing of the Russian or Irish revolutionary about these bright particular youths. They have no heroics. They are anything but goo-goos, they are dead against "slop." Incited by their leader, Gilbert Farrow, they develop certain improved priggish notions which, indefinite as they are, stimulate ambition of the kind not uncommon among university intellectuals—mainly ambition for those forms of social service not debarred by the Social Register.

The inclusion of Quinny in this group is postponed because Mr. Quinn will not allow his son to go to Cambridge, insists on his taking cold storage culture at Trinity College, Dublin. There is nothing national in this for Quinny, but the Gaelic enthusiast who comes to tutor him at Ballymartin opens his eyes to a new Ireland, though the rustic Ireland which would rather dance than study Gaelic, which only studies Gaelic to escape boredom, is not observed by this ascetic devotee.

In college Quinny buds as a novelist and his father speeds him to London to join his Improved Tory friends. The liveliness of Gilbert Farrow, the simple valuableness of Ninian Graham, the dry zeal of Roger, give Mr. Ervine a chance to dramatize interesting characters, especially with the interpolation of Mary Graham, Ninian's sheltered-violet sister, and the thin, statistical girl whom Roger marries, and the acquisitive Lady Cecily Jayne. Quinny first meets the Mary girl when he goes on a shy schoolboy vacation to Devonshire. Then, back among the country-people in Ulster, there is a vivid, red-blooded farmer's girl and a flare of youthful desire that obliterates Mary, and in London Lady Cecily finds him, so to speak, confluent. Being intrinsically vulgar and spoiled, but laughing and sensuous and beautiful, she makes things easy for a youth who is too timid to initiate the experience that he craves. These episodes are incidental to the house-life of the four youths, marked as it is by Gilbert Farrow's precocious exploits as a dramatist and the rest.

We are asked to believe that the Improved Tories attract eminent and semi-eminent men to their house, have Shaw and Wells and Edward Carpenter and others to sit at their table and share their minds. In this part of Mr. Ervine's invention there is distinctly something lacking. Gilbert Farrow is a charming person, thoroughly idiomatic, but in so far as he suggests Rupert Brooke, to whose memory the book is dedicated, he fails signally to suggest the Improved Tory whose faith in the empire as a commonwealth could have enough significance to swing Eminent Ones out of their orbit. The actual existence of the Round Table group in London is suggestive; but Mr. Ervine's engineer and dramatic critic and barrister and novelist are decidedly too callow to give even a suggestion of that influentiality which he wishes us to accept. In addition they do not talk like, say, the lads in The New Machiavelli, much less with the profundity one finds in Beauchamp's Career. They have a conventional relation to the class struggle and to government and to society; and when the war comes out of a Europe to which they scarcely advert they are in a simple khaki relation to it. So far, then, as Mr. Ervine has allowed his discipleship to H. G. Wells to lead him into discussing universal military service, factory organization, machine industry, etc., he has been badly bamboozled. You have to be a Meredith or at any rate a Wells to overflow into these creative fictional discussions, and where Mr. Ervine has attempted this he is tin painted to look like steel.

Where he has risen above schoolboy round-talk in London is in the talk about Ireland that is volcanically ejaculated by his father or incanted by the enthusiast Marsh, who suggests Padraic Pearse, or grudgingly squeezed out by Quinny himself. To rid Ireland of priest, publican, politician and poet is Quinny's trite formula, solving the question by begging it, but better than formulæ are the glimpses of Horace Plunkett, George Russell, Connolly, Padraic Pearse, and the Ireland that Quinny sees after he comes to care for Englishmen. The ways of such friendly speculation are cut short by the rebellion of Easter, 1916. As a deprecating spectator Quinny sees Dublin harried by the rebels. For him there is nothing of national redemption, national resurrection, about the *émeute*. Torpid though this may seem to some readers, it is the moderate attitude which is likely to be instructive to outsiders, and Mr. Ervine does include Ulster, England and Ireland in his representation.

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The effect of the war on Quinny is more keenly verified than anything else in the book. His father's rage against the recruiting campaign is the first note struck. "'Old men sittin' in offices, an' makin' wars, an' then biddin' young men to pay the price of them! By God, that is mean! By God, that 's low!' . . . 'An' these wee bitches with their white feathers,' he went on, 'ought to be well skelped. If I had a daughter, an' she did a thing like that, by God, I'd break her skull for her.'" But old Mr. Quinn succumbs to a war that threatens to take his son from him. Quinny's best friends in England are enlisting—they do not believe in fighting and dying by proxy—and enlistment is uppermost in Quinny's mind. After his father's death he visits the Grahams. His engagement to Mary gives him a fresh excuse for postponing enlistment and finally there is his work. "He would help to construct things, not to destroy them. He was not afraid to go to the war . . . that was not the reason why he was resolving that he would refuse to be a soldier. It was because he could do better, finer work by living for Ireland than by dying for England. People throughout Europe were already perturbed at the waste of potential men in war . . . wondering whether, after all, it was a wise thing to let rare men, men of unique gifts go to war." This, with an intervening fervor for conscription, tides Quinny along, but at last he is forced to realize that his is a case of funk. About this, and Mary's reception of it, Mr. Ervine is illuminating.

The utilization of contemporary personages and contemporary events gives Changing Winds an excitingness that has a sort of suggestion of genius. There are certain tricks about the book, however, that impair this impression. Mr. Ervine did not of course suppose that anyone would fail to see how frankly he had borrowed his Irish rebellion incidents from James Stephens's book on the rebellion, but the knowledge that these episodes and phrases are not native to Quinny breaks the spell of fictional illusion. The spell is also broken when Mr. Ervine brings in F. E. Smith after utilizing him for F. E. Robinson, and in the same way doubles Minnelly and Connolly, Ernest Harper and George Russell, John Marsh and Padraic Pearse. One identifies these persons as clearly as one identifies Tom Arthurs with Thomas Andrews, the Gigantic with the Titanic. Mr. Ervine knows that we will identify the Gigantic with the Titanic. How can he suppose that a flimsy alibi will disguise the use he has made of well known men? These are ugly flaws in his Changing Winds.

It is still impossible not to be engaged by the novel if only because it is a news-novel, if only because it dramatizes the life we are living. The symbols that are common property are no longer, exclusively, deities and daisies, suns and seas, "the glimmer of stars on moorland meres." Steam, rapid transit, wood pulp, the rotary press, telegraphy, stenography—these touches of artifice make the whole world kin and are responsible for the new way of writing fiction. The machine-process has so altered the subject-matter of our actions and thoughts and feelings that it is no wonder we have journalistic novels written from the standpoint not of the historian or the embalmer but of the participant, the eye-witness. Though not written in the first person, Changing Winds is hot from first-hand experience, an empiric version of reality, and it follows H. G. Wells quite closely in its aim to collect this epoch at a focus. Where the novel portrays the father, the winning personality of Gilbert, the introspection of Quinny, it is richest in inspiration as well as material. It has quick Scottish sentiment, and sanity and generosity. Its transmission of the epoch is not so distinguished. Mr. Ervine, in fact, is not deeply distinguished, if by that one means clearly differentiated by virtue of temperament, purity of feeling and sharpness of vision. So far as Ulster is concerned, however, he has done more than any pamphleteer. Wartime among young intellectuals he has made vivid, and the resources that alert minds and daring spirits and metropolitan issues afforded him he has managed in a fashion that would be quite amazing but for the example of Mr. Wells. F. H.

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What We Are Fighting For

American World Policies, by Walter E. Weyl. New York: The Macmillan Co. $2.25.

SLOWLY, reluctantly, we have drifted into war, but as a nation we are not yet of one mind as to what we are fighting for. This dangerous confusion Dr. Weyl attempts to dispel. His earlier book, The New Democracy, was a penetrating analysis of the undercurrents of American public opinion, of the forces that are shaping our internal policy. His present book is an equally keen analysis of the world forces to which our domestic policy must be adjusted if we are to keep our national integrity and play an effective part in shaping international affairs. It is an essay in clarification, an attempt to give the American layman the facts upon which to base an intelligent foreign policy.

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Dr. Weyl believes that what most Americans want is to help in building the structure of a permanent peace. But we have lived so long in the complacent security of isolation, that we show a perilous disposition to think that peace can be secured by merely wishing for it. With the negative, abstract, anaemic and thin-haired pacifism that looks upon war as a "reversion of mankind to a lower type, a betrayal of reason, a futile, revolting struggle, creating no rights, settling no problems and serving no useful purpose except, in Lord Salisbury's phrase, to teach people geography," Dr. Weyl has no sympathy. Neither does he sympathize with the militant mystics who defend war by elevating it high above reason and glorify it as "the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the ideal." War and peace, as he sees them, are normal functions of the national life, steps in national progress or retrogression, two paths often leading in the same direction. But at best, war is a crude, primitive, brutal and wasteful instrument of progress. Individually and socially, the permanent interests of mankind lie in the paths of peace. Which path we shall take depends not upon fate, but upon our ability to read the signs at the crossroads, upon our intellectual preparedness. "To enter upon an international career without a sense of the conditions underlying peace and war, is to walk in darkness along a dangerous path."

To see war truly, we must see it naked. Beneath the romance of marching and countermarching, the glamour of nationalistic aspirations, the idealism of adventurous individuals, the crude appetites of the masses that drive nations into conflict are in perpetual ferment. The fundamental cause of war is the pressure of excess populations upon the food supply. To ascribe world events to the action of a single individual is as naïve as the popular passion for loading the moral law of the universe upon the melodramatic villain. In Europe, as in America, men blamed the present war upon a wicked Kaiser, a swaggering, immature Crown Prince, a childish Poincaré, an unscrupulous Sir Edward Grey, an abysmally astute Sazonof. "So long as the belief holds that one man can set the world on fire, there can be no reasonable theory of war or peace."

The closer we study the incentives and origins of war, the more deeply do we find them imbedded in the very foundations of national life. "Historians are recognizing that the mainspring of social action is not an emperor's dream or soldier's ambition, but the demand of vast populations for food, clothing and shelter, then for more food, clothing and shelter, and finally for the rights, privileges and institutions which will make such economic progress assured. . . . Remove the economic factors leading to war, give men more than enough, and the chief incentive to war disappears."

Long before the present war, the European excess of births over deaths was about forty millions per decade. Population was steadily outracing agricultural production. The uncontrolled birth-rate was accumulating within national boundaries a volatile force of tremendous explosive power. Europe was constantly kept at dangerous tension. It was the boundaries of Germany that were put to the greatest strain. There church and state glorified the teeming population, contrasted with the race suicide of other nations, as a special manifestation of the favor of God. Her swarming millions were the mainspring of *Deutscher Kultur*. But industrial Germany came into the world late. She found the more fruitful agricultural regions of the earth preëmpted by England, Russia and France. She was barred from South America by our Monroe Doctrine. She was unwilling to surrender her children to foreign sovereignties. Denied the opportunity of nationalistic expansion in a world of expanding nations, she became the psychological victim of what Graham Wallas called a *baulked disposition*. The pressure of her prolific population upon her national boundaries kept her perpetually on the hair-trigger of war.

Had Germany been wise, she would have controlled her birth-rate and concentrated her energies upon plans for some kind of international economic adjustment. But she was in a world of nations—France, Italy, England, Japan—astir with growing dreams of nationalistic imperialism. Instead of risking her destiny upon the hypothetical comities of a possible world state, she discounted her handicap and set out to outdistance her rivals at their own game. Other nations had conquered colonies, but they had taken them from "backward races." By a psychological tour de force she persuaded herself that England, France and Russia were decadent or backward nations, too. What they had done in India, Manchuria, Morocco, she would do in Europe and the near East. She forced her way industrially into France, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium and Holland. She penetrated these countries economically, forced upon them her own industrial products, extracted from them the profits which they felt belonged to their own manufacturers. Industrially, commercially, financially, it is alleged, she sought to rule Italy and Belgium as Great Britain rules the Argentine or Canada. But all industrial nations export to one another as well as to agricultural countries upon which they depend for food. Why, then, was Germany's course so bitterly resented? "Germany exports not only wares but men, and not only men, but men who hold together, advance together, maintain the cult of *Deutschtum* in an alien country. . . . German competition is a disciplined state-aided competition, collective rather than individual. . . . The most striking difference between the flooding of adjacent markets by German cartels and the destruction of competitors by American trusts is that in the former case the operation is international, and the manufacturers who suffer live in one country and those who profit live in another. Moreover, the German government is itself directly concerned in the process. It is one of the associated concerns." In lieu of the conquest of colonies, Germany sought to feed her children from her neighbors' kitchens.

Dr. Weyl's analysis is neither a defense nor an indictment of Germany. His analysis of the imperialistic policies of England, France, Russia, Japan is equally trenchant and critical. It is not an attempt to place praise or blame, but to show that in a preëmpted world, nationalistic imperialism must inevitably lead to war. His sympathies in the present lie whole-heartedly with the democratic nations. But his enthusiasm for democracy does not blind him to the fact that democratic institutions in themselves provide no adequate guaranty against the explosive clash of international economic rivalries. Nationalistic imperialism requires the maintenance of large armaments. "If the nation is to be taxed for military budgets, and if the people as a whole secure an increasing veto over such expenditures, would it not seem likely that the democratic nations would look askance at dangerous imperialistic ventures which contribute so obviously to the danger of war and to the size of military expenditures?" The facts do not bear out the inference. The British public seems always willing to make sacrifices to extend the Empire. Great sections of the French democracy rejoiced at the "national humiliation" of Germany through the diplomatic triumph

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Franklin to His Printer Nephew

April 14, 1917.

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[1] The Yale University Library has in its possession a letter, dated October 27, 1753, from Benjamin Franklin to Mr. William Strahan, a London printer, directing him what type to order from Mr. Caslon for this printing-office.

[2] THE GROWTH OF MEDICINE, from the Earliest Times to about 1800. By Albert H. Buck. (Second Printing.) $5.00 net.

[3] PONTORMO. His Life and Work. By Frederick Mortimer Clapp. 153 illustrations. $7.50 net.

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
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of France in the Moroccan affair. Many people relied upon the growth of the German social democracy to make war impossible. But long before 1914, it had grown plain to the German workman that the English proletarians could not be depended upon to gain his salvation. "'We do not say that there are no conflicts of interests between nations,'" Dr. Weyl quotes a German Socialist authority, "'but we say, on the contrary, that as long as exploitation and oppression continue, there will be conflicts of interest between nations.' From which follows the conclusion that until capitalism is destroyed, and that may take many decades, it is essential for the workman to develop the welfare of the wage-earners of his own country, rather than of the world in general." The only escape is through the substitution of an international for the present nationalistic imperialism—an internationalism which will be the fulfilment and not the negation of nationalism.

The root of all imperialism is the demand of populations for food. The basis of any international arrangement designed to promote an enduring peace must be the joint development and fair distribution of the world's material resources. A League of Peace, unless it is more than a league of peace, will provide no satisfactory alternative to war. It would die of the endless flux in human affairs. "Pacifism that is static is doomed. Our only hope lies in a dynamic, evolutionary pacifism, based on a principle of ever-changing adjustment of nations to an ever-changing environment. . . . A dynamic pacifism must devise not only some rudimentary form of international government but also arrangements by which the things for which the nations go to war may peacefully be distributed or utilized in a manner equitable to all."

The United States is in a peculiarly advantageous position to promote the international economic arrangements upon which the hope of an enduring peace depends. With the exception of Russia, America is the only one of the first-rate western Powers capable, for an indefinite time to come, of producing food supplies in excess of the needs of her population. Our hope of remaining at peace ourselves and of contributing to the peace and economic reorganization of the world depends not only upon the conservation and development of our natural resources but also upon a distribution of wealth and income which will widen the consumption of the masses and will give to the whole population the opportunity of a full, varied and purposeful life. "All these things, as well as the moral discipline which we so urgently need, can be secured only as we learn to apply a national policy to our own nation. It is our own slackness, our own 'state-blindness,' our lack of complete democracy, which increases our chances of imperialism and war. It is, on the other hand, our increasing willingness to take a national view of our internal affairs, our increasing desire to base American prosperity upon American resources and to make life fuller and more valuable, that acts as a deterrent to war and fits us for the difficult task of contributing to world peace."

Precisely what form the international arrangements should take, Dr. Weyl does not assume to predict. Of one thing only he is certain—that peace to be enduring must grow out of the economic integration of the world. For this reason his analysis of the many plans that have been proposed leads him to prefer that of Mr. H. N. Brailsford which contemplates the formation of international syndicates "to establish colonial free trade and internationalize the export of capital." But the object of his book is rather to clear the ground than to anticipate the work of the international conference that will follow the present war. He has wisely avoided the temptation to write a paper constitution for a hypothetical world state, and has chosen instead to offer a preface to international politics. It is this quality of self-restraint, combined with his great ability to think and write clearly, interestingly and convincingly, that distinguishes Dr. Weyl's volume. American World Policies is an exceedingly valuable aid to the intellectual preparedness of American statesmen and laymen alike in this time of international crisis.

ROBERT W. BRUÈRE.

England's Army

Great Britain's Part, by Paul D. Cravath. New York: D Appleton & Co. $1.00.

THIS is not a book of statistics or of impressive charts comparing the few munitions factories in England at the beginning of the war with the thousands that now dot the peaceful countryside and city suburbs in a grim triumph of steel over human reason. It is not even a marshalling of the war's financial superlatives or an apologia in terms of the overwhelming and tragic casualty lists. It is a slight bit of impressionistic reporting based on a visit to the British General Headquarters and the Somme battle front at the height of last summer's offensive. Mr. Cravath saw the tremendous organization, the enormous personnel, the vast expanse of the physical engineering properties which give to modern war the specious appearance of a gigantic coöperative industry. He marvelled at it honestly and naïvely. That admiration for the organizing and accomplishing ability of the English when put to it he originally reflected in a series of semi-descriptive articles for the New York Times. These articles are here gathered together in a thin book of not two hours' reading, which is far too sketchy and meagre to justify a defiance of the high cost of paper by adding another pebble to the mountain of war-books. But one conviction strongly and instinctively held by Mr. Cravath catches our interest. The conviction is that England will win, that nothing can stop the new army. Since we have ourselves entered the war, we have been glad of any reassurance, however uncritical or dogmatic. Mr. Cravath's conviction is both, yet he has the power to convey his conviction to his readers.

Contributors

to this issue

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